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COMMENT
AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIA TION OF AMERICA v
DEPAR TMENT OF TRANSPOR TA TION:
EXCESS BAGGAGE FOR RULES
OF AGENCY PROCEDURE
Over the past two centuries, Congress has established administrative agen-
cies as a means to contend with social problems and to regulate specific ac-
tivities of individuals and businesses.' Today, these agencies carry out this
function using one or both of two mechanisms: rulemaking and adjudica-
tion.2 Statutory sources govern the procedure for rulemaking conducted by
federal agencies. Primarily, agencies conduct rulemaking in accordance
with the manner prescribed by Congress in an agency's enabling statute.3 In
1. The first administrative agencies, established by congressional act in 1789, provided
pensions for soldiers wounded in the war and decided the amount of duties payable on im-
ports. KENNETH C. DAVIS, 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1:7, at 17 (2d ed. 1978);
see also BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 1. 10, at 20-22 (2d ed. 1984) (discuss-
ing the origins of administrative agencies in the United States). It was not until the establish-
ment of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887, however, that Congress began to
confer upon administrative agencies broad regulatory powers. SCHWARTZ, supra, at 21-22
(recognizing this date as "the beginning of our administrative law").
2. At the outset of administrative regulation, agencies relied on adjudication to issue
regulatory standards and policy determinations. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPI-
ORO & PAUL R. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 30-32 (1985) (attributing
the success of this "fourth branch of government" to the reliance on an adversary hearing
system and the availability of judicial review). Agencies acted in their quasi-judicial function
to determine the rights and obligations of specific parties to an action brought by the agency in
an adversarial setting. Retrospective in nature, adjudication is governed by due process princi-
ples and is binding only on the parties to the action. In contrast, rulemaking developed out of
the need for agencies to regulate effectively on a national scale without relying solely on limited
enforcement resources. By promulgating rules, the agency acts prospectively, announcing ad-
ministrative determinations of general applicability. For a basic discussion of the distinction
between rulemaking and adjudication, compare Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equaliza-
tion, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) with Londoner v. City & County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
See also TOM C. CLARK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1947) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL],
reprinted in GARY J. EDLES & JEROME NELSON, FEDERAL REGULATORY PROCESS: AGENCY
PRACTICES & PROCEDURES 393, 407 (2d ed. 1989) (discussing the "dichotomy" created by
rulemaking and adjudication).
3. The "enabling" or "authorizing" statute, enacted by Congress, serves many functions.
The statute authorizes the creation of an agency and provides a statement of the agency's
general purpose. Congress circumscribes the agency's scope of regulatory power in an en-
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addition, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) sets forth requirements
that govern generally agency activity.4 Thus, absent specific Congressional
direction, the APA assures a minimum level of procedural compliance.
Congress alone retains the authority to allow lesser procedural conformance
with the APA when it empowers a specific agency with rulemaking and ad-
judicatory authority.'
Section 553 of the APA details the procedural requirements that federal
agencies must follow when promulgating rules.6 Informal rulemaking under
the APA 7 necessitates such actions as notification of proposed rulemaking
abling statute and defines the manner in which an agency may issue guidelines, orders, and
rules. In addition, an enabling statute establishes the nature of the relationship between an
agency and other branches of government and provides certain controls over agency action
through judicial review, Congressional oversight, and executive scrutiny. See generally AR-
THUR E. BONFIELD & MICHAEL AsiMow, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §
7.2, at 422-23 (1989) (discussing the relationship between administrative agencies and the
elected branch of government that defines the scope of the agency's authority).
4. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5362,
7521 (1988) (originally enacted as Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat.
237 (1946)). Codification of the APA occurred in 1966. Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-
554, 80 Stat. 378. With the exception of minor changes in terminology and the assignment of
new section numbers, the substance of the APA has remained largely intact. See William H.
Allen, The Durability of the Administrative Procedure Act, 72 VA. L. REV. 235, 235 nn.4-5
(1986) (commenting on the purpose of codification and the confusion which the renumbering
of the sections introduced).
5. While agencies may and often do employ procedures in addition to those required by
the APA, the procedures may not fall below the statutory minima established by the APA.
ERNEST GELLHORN & RONALD M. LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 322 (3d
ed. 1990).
6. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 553. Other sections of the APA concern, for example, adju-
dication, id. §§ 554, 556-57, license applications, id. § 558, and judicial review of agency ac-
tion. Id. §§ 701-706. The APA does not, however, prescribe the appropriate procedures for
state agencies. State administrative bodies are governed by the statutory scheme enacted by a
state's legislature. In addition, the Model State Administrative Procedure Act (MSAPA),
originally adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
1946 and revised in 1961 and again in 1981, has provided the states with a successful reference
point since a number of states have adopted this act either in its entirety or in substantial part.
MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, 1981 Act, 15 U.L.A. 1 (1990) (original
version at 9C U.L.A. 179 (1957); 1961 Act at 15 U.L.A. 137 (1990)). See Arthur E. Bonfield,
State Administrative Policy Formulation and the Choice of Lawmaking Methodology, 42 AD-
MIN. L. REV. 121, 123 n.5, 135 n.37 (1990) (stating that most states enacted APAs based on
the 1961 MSAPA). See generally ARTHUR E. BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE
RULEMAKING 12-16 n.20 (1986) (reviewing the 1946, 1961, and 1981 versions of the Model
State Administrative Procedure Act and listing the states that have enacted an APA based to
some degree on the original MSAPA or its 1961 revision).
7. Informal rulemaking refers to agency action conducted in compliance with procedures
as specified in § 553 of the APA. That section details the procedures for public participation
in the rulemaking process through notice and comment. See infra note 13. Formal rulemak-
ing, on the other hand, involves procedures typically reserved for adjudication. The language
"on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing" in an agency's authorizing statute
automatically invokes §§ 556 and 557 of the APA, replacing public participation through no-
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by publication in the Federal Register,' involvement of the general public
through notice and comment,9 and adoption of a thirty-day waiting period
before a final rule is made effective and implementedo Designed to protect
the interests of both the regulated members of the general public"' and the
government entity responsible for the regulation of a particular activity, the
APA attempts to strike a balance permitting efficient and effective regulation
while also protecting due process and such other basic concepts of fairness
that a nonrepresentative governmental body might suggest. 2
tice and comment with the increased opportunities for participation afforded in an administra-
tive hearing. Although formal rulemaking is infrequently used, it has been criticized as
"vary[ing] from unnecessarily drawn out proceedings to virtual disasters." Robert W. Hamil-
ton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: The Need for Procedural
Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CAL. L. REV. 1276, 1287 (1972); see also PETER
L. STRAUSS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 155-
59 (1989) (describing the courts' reluctance to require formal rulemaking where such proceed-
ings are "notoriously inconvenient ... given the frequent diffuseness of the issues presented
and the large number of parties"). See also United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S.
224 (1973), for an introductory discussion on the applicability of formal rulemaking. To ac-
commodate increasing agency activity with the demand for greater public participation with-
out having to resort to the delays and complications of formal rulemaking, legislators and
courts have, over the past two decades, begun to explore alternative measures, developing
procedures known as "hybrid rulemaking" that combine elements from both ends of the spec-
trum. GELLHORN & LEVIN, supra note 5, at 329-32, 335-36.
8. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). The Federal Register is a daily governmental publication by
which the executive branch informs the public of a wide variety of agency activities, including
an agency's intention to change a rule or issue a new rule through a proposed rulemaking.
Rules in final form are then published in the Code of Federal Regulations. See generally OF-
FICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, NAT'L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., THE FEDERAL REGIS-
TER: WHAT IT IS AND HOW TO USE IT (Robert D. Fox & Ernie Sowada, eds., 1985).
9. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
10. Id. § 553(d).
11. Agency rulemaking rarely affects all members of society. Rather, the regulations,
standards, and rules that an agency issues are generally targeted to a specific group of individu-
als or businesses engaged in a particular activity. For example, the regulations promulgated
by the United States Department of Interior detailing federal supervison of state regulatory
programs under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 potentially affect
citizens' groups, coal mine operators, representatives of the coal industry, and state regulatory
agencies. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hodel, 839 F.2d 694, 702-03 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (con-
cluding that petitioners had standing to challenge revised regulations as issued by the Secre-
tary). Rules frequently affect individuals indirectly, and their scope may not always be readily
apparent. See, e.g., Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960) (holding
that the agency action imposing mandatory retirement for airline pilots over the age of 60
potentially affected 18,000 licensed pilots under the age of 60 and future airline pilots, not only
pilots currently falling within that category).
12. National Ass'n of Home Health Agencies v. Schweiker, 690 F.2d 932, 949 (D.C. Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1205 (1983). In Schweiker, the D.C. Circuit cited two main
reasons for the impetus behind the § 553 procedural requirements: "First, 'to reintroduce pub-
lic participation and fairness to affected parties after governmental authority has been dele-
gated to unrepresentative agencies.' And second, to 'assure[ ] that the agency will have before
it the facts and information relevant to a particular administrative problem, as well as sugges-
tions for alternative solutions.' " Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Batterton v. Marshall, 648
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Certain types of agency activity, however, relax the tension between
agency efficiency and public participation and justify the inclusion in the
APA of specific exemptions to the procedural requirements of § 553.13 For
example, an agency may promulgate interpretations, statements of policy,
and procedural rules without notice and comment according to § 553(b)(A)
of the APA.14 These types of rules differ from "substantive"-or "legis-
F.2d 694, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1980) and Guardian Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Say. & Loan
Ins. Corp., 589 F.2d 658, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1978)); see also United States Dep't of Labor v. Kast
Metals Corp., 744 F.2d 1145, 1151-52 (5th Cir. 1984) (considering the legislative purposes
behind the exemptions of § 553 rulemaking procedures).
13. The text of § 553 provides in relevant part:
(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Regis-
ter, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or other-
wise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law. The notice shall include-
(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making proceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the
subjects and issues involved.
Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection does not
apply-
(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency
organization, procedure, or practice; or
(B) when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and
a brief statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued) that notice and public
procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public
interest.
(c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons an
opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data,
views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation. After consid-
eration of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules
adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose. When rules are re-
quired by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing,
sections 556 and 557 of this title apply instead of this subsection.
(d) The required publication or service of a substantive rule shall be made not less
than 30 days before its effective date, except-
(1) a substantive rule which grants or recognizes an exemption or relieves a
restriction;
(2) interpretative rules and statements of policy; or
(3) as otherwise provided by the agency for good cause found and published
with the rule.
(e) Each agency shall give an interested person the right to petition for the issuance,
amendment, or repeal of a rule.
5 U.S.C. § 553.
14. See supra note 13. Section 553(b)(A) refers only to exempting these rules from "no-
tice," but "comment" under § 553(c) is invoked only when notice is mandated. That is, the
introductory phrase to section 553(c) "[a]fter notice required by this section" makes specific
reference to the general notice provision under section 553(b), establishing notice as a prerequi-
site to comment. See Kast Metals, 744 F.2d at 1153 n.16; Pickus v. United States Bd. of
Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1112 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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lative"-rules 15 that have the force of law, effectively imposing new obli-
gations and duties or altering the behavior or status of those within the
purview of the proposed rule. 16 Commentators and courts generally refer to
the "substantive-procedural" dichotomy when discussing procedural rules,
but use the terms "legislative" and "non-legislative" in the context of the
APA exemptions for interpretative rules and general statements of policy. 7
In considering the exemptions, 8 Congress viewed the need for encouraging
agency activity as greater than the need for public participation.' 9 The
APA, however, provides no further elaboration on the scope of the terms
15. GELLHORN & LEVIN, supra note 5, at 315-20.
16. See American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The
court here distinguished legislative rules from non-binding agency action, the latter of which
"carr[ies] no more weight on judicial review than [its] inherent persuasiveness commands."
Id. (quoting Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). While the APA does
not define the term "substantive," courts have relied on the interpretation provided in the
Attorney General's Manual on the APA recognizing as such all rules "issued by an agency
pursuant to statutory authority and which implement the statute." ATrORNEY GENERAL'S
MANUAL, supra note 2, reprinted in EDLES & NELSON, at 423 n.3. Thus, a clear example of a
substantive rulemaking would be the issuance of a regulation by an agency where Congress has
mandated such action but deferred to the agency's expertise for precise formulation. As both
the APA and its legislative history are silent on the matter of distinguishing between "substan-
tive" and "procedural" rules, courts have attributed much weight to the definition in the Man-
ual. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 n.31 (1979) (citing favorably the
interpretation of the Attorney General's Manual). The Supreme Court's reliance on the Man-
ual in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519, 546 (1978), further attests to the Manual's usefulness. In Vermont Yankee, the Man-
ual provided confirmation of Congress' intent that only agencies, not courts, may confer addi-
tional rulemaking procedures when deemed necessary. Id. Issued by the Justice Department
following enactment of the APA, the Manual contains perhaps the closest approximation of
congressional intent because of that agency's considerable participation in the legislative pro-
cess. Id.
17. See BENJAMIN W. MINTZ & NANCY G. MILLER, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY
RULEMAKING 49-50, 52-54 & n.62 (2d ed. 1991). Some courts, however, recognize the terms
"substantive" and "legislative" as interchangeable. See, e.g., Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194
F.2d 329, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
18. Section 553 also provides for situations in which time constraints and other concerns
necessitate abbreviated rulemaking. For example, an exemption from the requirement that
substantive rules be issued subject to a 30-day postponement of effective date is granted in
subsection (d) for emergency rulemaking or for rules which relieve a restriction and therefore
require no public adjustment period. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d); see supra note 13. While this exemp-
tion applies only to a specific requirement under § 553, others remove certain agency activity
from § 553 applicability altogether. Such are the exemptions under § 553(a)(1) for agency
activity that concerns "a military or foreign affairs function of the United States" and under
§ 553(a)(2) for "matter[s] relating to agency management or personnel or to public property,
loans, grants, benefits, or contracts." 5 U.S.C. § 553(a).
19. Guardian Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 589 F.2d 658,
662 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (citing "effectiveness, efficiency, expedition and reduction in expense" as
the basic reasons behind the exceptions to § 553 procedures); see also American Hosp. Ass'n v.
Bowen, 834 F.2d 1045, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (explaining that the exemptions were designed to
permit agencies to operate with freedom from costly and time consuming procedures).
1993]
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"interpretative" or "procedural," and the task of distinguishing the legisla-
tive rule from the non-legislative rule or the substantive rule from the proce-
dural rule has, in the course of litigation, fallen on the judiciary.2 °
The exemption for rules of "agency organization, procedure, or practice"
under § 553(b)(A) of the APA and the inherent ambiguity surrounding the
substantive-procedural distinction are currently the subject of considerable
controversy. In its recent decision Air Transport Association of America v.
Department of Transportation,2 the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia struggled with the task of defining "procedural." The
Air Transport case illustrates well the courts' inability to reach an acceptable
approach for defining the scope of the § 553(b)(A) exemption and for carv-
ing out the court's role in reviewing agency action.22
This Comment examines the notice-and-comment exemption for agency
rules of procedure under § 553(b)(A) of the APA. In light of the ambiguity
posed by the statutory language and its legislative history, this Comment
reviews the prevailing judicial interpretations governing the scope of the ex-
emption, including the approaches most recently presented by the majority
and dissenting opinions in Air Transport. Next, this Comment analyzes the
different judicial approaches, evaluating their underlying rationale and iden-
tifying their significance on the rules at issue in the Air Transport case and
on rules of procedure generally. This Comment then proposes an alternative
response to the issue of defining the term "procedural" based on the cases
surveyed and on analogous policies governing a recent court interpretation
of the exemption under § 553(b)(A) for interpretative rules. In conclusion,
this Comment proposes that the approach articulated by the court in Air
Transport is sufficiently deficient to render its future prominence unlikely,
20. The legislative history is equally unrevealing. See infra notes 31 and 160.
21. 900 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1990), vacated, I1I S. Ct. 944 (1991).
22. Ultimate resolution of the notice-and-comment issue beleaguering rules of procedure,
however, was never achieved in Air Transport. A troubled history followed the divided Court
of Appeals decision. The Supreme Court granted the government's petition for certiorari. 11l
S. Ct. 669, vacated, 111 S. Ct. 944 (1991). The association, however, filed a motion with the
court indicating that neither it nor its members were interested in pursuing its challenge. ATA
Supplemental Brief at 11, Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Department of Transp., 900 F.2d 369
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (No. 89-1195). Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the lower court's
order and remanded the case for determination of the issue of mootness. 900 F.2d 369, va-
cated, 111 S. Ct 944, and dismissed as moot, 933 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (per curiam). In a
separate concurrence, Judge Silberman revealed his impatience with the course that the case
had taken, reprimanding Air Transport for its "misrepresentations to us, or, in effect, a confes-
sion of error to the Supreme Court after certiorari was granted." Id. at 1043-44 (Silberman, J.,
concurring). The issue of ripeness had been argued before the Court of Appeals at the outset
of the litigation, and the court found in favor of Air Transport holding that the procedural
challenge to the rule was a purely legal issue that presented no reason for delaying judicial
review. 900 F.2d at 374.
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leaving the position advocated by Judge Silberman in the Air Transport dis-
sent to prevail.
I. VARIED APPROACHES TO ADDRESSING THE SCOPE OF THE
EXEMPTION FOR RULES OF AGENCY ORGANIZATION,
PROCEDURE, OR PRACTICE
The APA represents the culmination of efforts by the executive and legis-
lative branches of the federal government, as well as private interests, to
reform the structure of administrative agencies.23 Congress sought primar-
ily to introduce uniformity and to secure fairness and administrative imparti-
ality in light of an increasing dependence on federal agency adjudications.24
The Supreme Court of the United States, which had the opportunity to re-
view the history and purposes of the APA shortly after its enactment, 25
characterized the APA as a "formula upon which opposing social and polit-
ical forces have come to rest."
2 6
The legislative history of the APA elaborates on the reasons behind the
congressional action prescribing notice-and-comment rulemaking proce-
dures in § 553.27 First, the requirements of a proposed rule's publication
and involvement of the public serve to inform and educate the agency, pro-
moting reasoned decisionmaking by agencies that conduct rulemaking activ-
ities. 28 Second, inviting an exchange between the public and the administra-
tive agencies was designed to introduce safeguards to offset the lack of
agency accountability inherent in the administrative scheme. 29 As the D.C.
Circuit recently acknowledged, "by mandating 'openness, explanation, and
23. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 36-42 (1950); see also DAVIS, supra note
1, § 1:7, at 24 (stating that "[t]he major effects of the Act were to satisfy the political will for
reform, to improve and strengthen the administrative process, and to preserve the basic limits
upon judicial review").
24. Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S. at 36-42.
25. Id.
26. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 302, 313 (1979) (quoting Wong Yang Sung, 339
U.S. at 40).
27. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., S. Doc. No. 248 (Comm.
Print 1945), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
at 18-20 (1946); see also Peter J. Henning, Note, An Analysis of the General Statement of Policy
Exception to Notice and Comment Procedures, 73 GEO. L.J. 1007, 1012 (1985) (articulating the
policies that support notice and comment as (1) "allow[ing] the agency to test a proposal
before the parties directly affected by a rule" and (2) "afford[ing] safeguards to private
interests").
28. S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 27, at 19-20.
29. Id. In Aiken v. Obledo, 442 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. Cal. 1977), the court emphasized this
objective stating that "[t]he interchange of ideas between the government and its citizenry
provides a broader base for intelligent decision-making and promotes greater responsiveness to
the needs of the people." Id. at 651.
1993]
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participatory democracy' in the rulemaking process, these procedures assure
the legitimacy of administrative norms. ' 30
The legislative history of the APA, however, provides little insight into
the envisioned application of the exemption for interpretative rules, rules of
procedure, and general statements of policy under § 553.31 It nonetheless
reveals that the objective of Congress in enacting § 553(b)(A) was to en-
courage agency promulgation of certain types of rules and to defer to the
agency's judgment where public input might impede the effectiveness of the
administrative process.32 Congress believed that the availability of judicial
review relieved it of the obligation to impose additional procedural burdens
where it regarded public participation as ineffective and unnecessary.33
The ambiguity that courts have encountered when interpreting the exemp-
tion provisions in § 553(b)(A) stems from the substantive-procedural distinc-
tion alluded to by Congress in its legislative history.34 Yet the real catalyst
for the controversy surrounding the distinction can be found in Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, in which
the Supreme Court expressed disapproval of courts' imposing on agencies
their view of acceptable administrative procedures where the APA has delin-
eated minimum compliance standards.35 Vermont Yankee mandated a clear
distinction between the legal bounds of statutory construction, a traditional
30. Air Transport Ass'n of Am. v. Department of Transp., 900 F.2d 369, 375 (1990)
(quoting Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1978)), vacated, 111 S.
Ct. 944 (1991).
31. See S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 27, at 18.
32. Id. at 18-19.
33. Id. In suggesting the clarification of the word "substantive," the Committee noted
that "strictly speaking, it should be unnecessary to provide ... that procedural or organiza-
tional rules are exempted; but the exemption was specified out of an abundance of caution lest
it be thought by those unversed in administrative law definitions that they might be included in
the notice requirement." Id. at 19.
34. See supra text accompanying note 16.
35. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). In Vermont Yankee, the D.C. Circuit ruled that compliance
with APA procedures was insufficient in the rulemaking proceedings initiated by the Atomic
Energy Commission. Specifically, the rulemaking at issue in Vermont Yankee sought to ad-
dress the question of what consideration was due to both the environmental effects incident to
fuel reprocessing and the disposal of wastes required as a result of that reprocessing. The
Supreme Court rejected the lower court's mandate for "a more 'sensitive' application of [the]
devices employed" in the rulemaking proceeding. Id. at 542. Citing the legislative history of
the APA and the Attorney General's Manual, the Court emphatically renounced the interfer-
ence of the lower court in determining the necessity of additional procedures in administrative
rulemaking. Under the APA, deference should be accorded to the Commission's deliberate
decision not to make discovery or cross-examination available to the parties in interest. Only
in "extremely compelling circumstances" might judicially-engrafted procedures be warranted.
Id. at 543. The Court remanded the decision to assure compliance with the APA along with
the message not to "stray beyond the judicial province to explore the procedural format or to
impose upon the agency its own notion of which procedures are 'best.'" Id. at 549.
[Vol. 42:313
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function of the judiciary,36 and the impermissible practice of demanding ad-
ditional procedures beyond those required in the APA.3 7 Complying with
the mandate of Vermont Yankee, however, posed substantial difficulties for
courts interpreting the scope of the exemption under § 553(b)(A), due
largely to the inherent vagueness of the substantive-procedural distinction.38
The ambiguity resulting from the statutory requirements of § 553(b)(A),
compounded by the uncertainty over the applicability of the Supreme
Court's decision in Vermont Yankee, has produced a variety of judicial ap-
proaches for determining whether notice and comment is properly required
for rules characterized as procedural. In order for agencies to take advan-
tage of the express authority to circumvent the "cumbersome and time-con-
suming mechanisms of public input,"39 agencies must first assess which of
the judicial approaches a court is likely to rely upon and which might ulti-
mately prevail. These approaches include:' (1) the "substantial impact"
test, the approach most consistently used in adjudicating § 553(b)(A) appli-
cability and articulated most recently in United States Department of Labor
v. Kast Metals Corp. ;41 (2) the deviation from the substantial impact test
proposed in Batterton v. Marshall;42 (3) the "encod[ing] a substantive value
judgment" inquiry formulated in American Hospital Association v. Bowen ;43
and finally (4) the dichotomy presented in Air Transport Association of
America v. Department of Transportation by the majority and dissenting
36. The Supreme Court in Wong Yang Sung emphasized that it is the responsibility of the
courts "regardless of their views of the wisdom or policy of the [APA] to construe this reme-
dial legislation to eliminate, so far as its text permits, the practices it condemns." Wong Yang
Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 45 (1950).
37. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 542-43.
38. See, e.g., Air Transport Ass'n of Am. v. Department of Transp., 900 F.2d 369 (D.C.
Cir. 1990), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 944 (1991); American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037
(D.C. Cir. 1987); United States Dep't of Labor v. Kast Metals Corp., 744 F.2d 1145 (5th Cir.
1984); Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
39. Kast Metals, 744 F.2d at 1152.
40. Not considered here is the view adopted by the Ninth Circuit, which in 1983 rejected
the substantial impact test, adhering fast to the explicit acknowledgment of Congress that
certain rules were to be exempt from statutory procedures notwithstanding their substantive
character. Rivera v. Becerra, 714 F.2d 887, 891 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1099
(1984); Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. FERC, 770 F.2d 779, 783 (9th Cir. 1985). Following the
recent departure by the D.C. Circuit in Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234, 238 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
whereby the court rejected the substantial impact test for interpretative rules, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the rules issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission governing the
approval of interim rates were properly promulgated without notice and comment as "techni-
cal regulation of the form of agency action and proceedings." Southern Cal. Edison Co., 770
F.2d at 783 (quoting Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1113 (D.C. Cir.
1974)).
41. 744 F.2d 1145 (5th Cir. 1984).
42. 648 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
43. 834 F.2d 1037, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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opinions-the majority identifying "the right to avail oneself of an adminis-
trative adjudication"" as crucial; the dissent advancing the inquiry of
whether the rulemaking "purports to direct, control, or condition the behav-
ior of those institutions or individuals subject to regulation by the authoriz-
ing statute."45
A. The Substantial Impact Test: United States Department of Labor v.
Kast Metals Corp.
The substantial impact test, first articulated in 1968 in National Motor
Freight Traffic Association v. United States,46 recognizes the need for notice
and comment where agency regulations have a substantial impact on desig-
nated industries or individuals.4 7 As explained in United States Department
of Labor v. Kast Metals Corp., a regulation that "modifies substantive rights
and interests" must withstand the scrutiny and proposed alternatives of pub-
lic input.48 Because rules with a substantial impact are at most only "nomi-
nally procedural," invocation of the exemption under § 553(b)(A) for rules
of procedure is inappropriate.4 9
Kast Metals presents a recent and thorough illustration of the substantial
impact test.50 In that case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit overturned the district court's determination that the challenged reg-
ulation issued by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA)51 required notice and comment because it altered the likelihood and
frequency of inspection for employers. 52 Notwithstanding the conspicuous
absence of notice and comment, the court in Kast Metals upheld the validity
of the OSHA inspection warrant issued to Kast Metals Corporation and
ruled that the OSHA regulation setting forth a new administrative scheme
44. 900 F.2d 369, 378 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (emphasis omitted), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 669 (1991).
45. Id. at 382 (Silberman, J., dissenting).
46. 268 F. Supp. 90, 97 (D.D.C. 1967) (three-judge court), aff'dper curiam, 393 U.S. 18
(1968).
47. United States Dep't of Labor v. Kast Metals Corp., 744 F.2d 1145, 1153 (5th Cir.
1984) (quoting Brown Express, Inc. v. United States, 607 F.2d 695, 702 (5th Cir. 1979)).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 744 F.2d 1145 (5th Cir. 1984).
51. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration was established pursuant to the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act), Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1592
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 651-678 (1988 & Supp. 111990)). Its responsibilities include
developing and issuing safety and health regulations for workers in the United States, con-
ducting investigations and inspections to promote and ensure compliance with the OSH Act,
and enforcing the OSH Act and the regulations promulgated by OSHA through the issuance
of citations and penalties. OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER, NATL'L ARCHIVES &
RECORDS ADMIN., THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 418 (1991).
52. Kast Metals, 744 F.2d at 1147-48.
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by which the agency selects employers for routine safety and health inspec-
tion was procedural within the meaning of the APA.5 3 In reversing the
lower court's decision, however, the court of appeals disagreed with the
lower court's application of the facts, but sustained the lower court's use of
the substantial impact test.54
Agency regulations that require a departure from previous practice are, on
the other hand, particularly vulnerable under the substantial impact test.55
The Kast Metals court, as an example, cited a previous OSHA rule that
eliminated an employer's right to a pre-issuance challenge of an inspection
warrant in favor of ex parte warrant proceedings. 56 The "180-degree shift in
agency practice" that the rule represented constituted a "substantial im-
pact," mandating notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures. 57 The court
concluded, however, that the OSHA instruction delineating selection for
safety inspection "casts not the stone of substantial impact. '" A change in
inspection methodology without the attendant substantial impact is insuffi-
cient to warrant notice and comment.59
53. Id. The agency implemented the change because it sought a more objective and effi-
cient selection methodology. Id. at 1147. The challenged regulation, OSHA instruction CPL
2.25B, selected employers for health inspections by ranking employers according to both the
number of hazardous substances involved and data concerning potential employee exposure to
those substances. Id. at 1147-48 n. 1. On the other hand, selection for safety inspections under
CPL 2.25B rests on the agency's assessment of a company's lost workdays due to injury or
illness in light of national averages. Id.
54. Id. at 1153. The court in Kast Metals first established that the OSHA regulation was,
in fact, a rule and thus subject to APA procedural guidelines. Id. at 1149-51. Applying the
substantial impact test, the court held that the OSHA regulation governing the method of
selecting employers for on-site inspections did not sufficiently affect the rights and interests of
Kast Metals Corporation to render it invalid for promulgation without notice and comment.
Id. at 1154-56.
55. Id. at 1154-56.
56. Id. at 1155 (citing Donovan v. Huffines Steel Co., 645 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'g
mem. 488 F. Supp. 995 (N.D. Tex. 1979)).
57. Id. at 1156.
58. Id. at 1153. Throughout the opinion, Judge Goldberg lends his wit to the discussion
of the applicability of § 553(b)(A) to the OSHA regulation. Id. at 1145 passim. Rejecting the
company's contention that notice and comment should be required where OSHA is merely
engaging in a "rational version of eenie-meenie-minie-moe," the opinion sets the tone for other
disgruntled employers bringing similar actions. Id. at 1155. In its final utterance, the court
states: "Iet the die be Kast." Id. at 1156.
59. Id. at 1156. The Kast Metals court cautions against too readily finding a substantial
impact in agency-issued regulations. Id. The court held that every agency "proclamation"
does not require notice and comment. Id. "Words such as 'rule,' 'impact,' 'procedure,' et
cetera, must contain within their syllables an alphabetical concatenation: the application of
practicality and reasonableness, and the actual on-the-site effect upon the agency as well as
upon the employer of whatever has been promulgated." Id.
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Recognizing the difficulties that accompany the substance-procedure dis-
tinction," the court stated that "the substantial impact test is the primary
means by which courts look beyond the label 'procedural' to determine
whether a rule is of the type Congress thought appropriate for public partici-
pation."'" However, the court in Kast Metals did not rely on the substantial
impact test without evaluating emerging viewpoints that question its validity
or even reject it outright.62
The Kast Metals court began by addressing the conclusion of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that Vermont Yankee pre-
cludes imposing notice-and-comment requirements for reasons of substantial
impact alone.63  The Ninth Circuit in Rivera v. Becerra ruled that the sub-
stantial impact approach prevented courts from complying with Vermont
Yankee because the inquiry presents courts with a subtle invitation to substi-
tute their views of the appropriate level of procedural protection in agency
rulemaking. 6' Rejecting the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit, the court in
Kast Metals asserted that Vermont Yankee does not apply to the purely legal
question of determining compliance with APA notice-and-comment proce-
dures. 65 The court concluded that Vermont Yankee speaks to court action
imposing additional procedural requirements upon agencies above and be-
yond those required by the APA once the initial determination of APA com-
pliance has been settled.66 The court in Kast Metals thus separated the
threshold question of § 553 applicability from the concerns voiced in Ver-
60. Id. at 1152-53. "[T]he distinction between a rule of procedure and one of substance is
not black and white." Id. at 1152 (citing Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715
F.2d 897, 909 (5th Cir. 1983) and Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 702-03 nn.37-38 (D.C.
Cir. 1980)).
61. Kast Metals, 744 F.2d at 1153. The court is cognizant of both the problems presented
by the substantive-procedural distinction, which it readily acknowledges "def[ies] ready appli-
cation," as well as the deficiencies of the substantial impact test which "represent[ ], albeit
imperfectly, the judicial attempt to pour content into [its] use." Id. at 1154 n. 19.
62. Id. at 1154 n.19.
63. Id. (citing Rivera v. Becerra, 714 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1099
(1984)).
64. Id. The Rivera court posited that Vermont Yankee clearly admonished reviewing
courts from "engraft[ing] 'their own notions of proper procedures upon agencies' beyond the
requirements of section 553." Rivera, 714 F.2d at 891 (quoting Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 525 (1978)).
65. Kast Metals, 744 F.2d at 1154 n.19.
66. Id. Compare Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 708-10 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (distin-
guishing Vermont Yankee because it presented no question as to whether the agency employed
the statutory minima as prescribed by the APA) with Association of Nat'l Advertisers v. FTC,
617 F.2d 611, 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (interpreting Vermont Yankee as requiring courts to afford
agencies "breathing room to comply with the congressional mandate to work their will within
the law, to experiment and to innovate in the public interest in an effort, among other things,
to relieve the three constitutional branches of some of the more mundane chores of govern-
ment" (footnote omitted)). See also supra note 35.
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mont Yankee. The issue before the court in Kast Metals-whether OSHA,
in promulgating the inspection instructions, had fulfilled its requirements
under the APA of providing notice and comment-was therefore a legal task
and well within the province of the courts.67 Falling outside the scope of the
Supreme Court's edict in Vermont Yankee, the substantial impact test re-
mains the appropriate legal test for determining the procedural nature of an
administrative rule.68
The court in Kast Metals continued by distinguishing its case from the
decision of the D.C. Circuit in Cabais v. Egger,69 which explicitly rejected
the substantial impact test for the purposes of determining the interpretative
nature of a rule in evaluating the need for notice and comment under
§ 553(b)(A). 7° Noting the Cabais court's express intention to limit its hold-
ing to interpretative rules under § 553(b)(A),7 the court in Kast Metals ad-
hered instead to the subsequent D.C. Circuit decision Lamoille Valley
Railroad Co. v. ICC.72 Lamoille Valley demonstrated the D.C. Circuit's
continued intention to rely on the substantial impact test for determining the
procedural nature of a rule.73 That decision thus dispelled any ambiguity as
to the applicability of Cabais to procedural rules and indicated that the sub-
stantial impact test, although rejected for interpretative rules, was still alive
and well for determining the exempt status of procedural rules.74
The underlying grounds for adhering to the well-established, if somewhat
unsatisfactory, 75 substantial impact test persisted, and the desire to act in
67. Kast Metals, 744 F.2d at 1154 n.19.
68. Id. (stating that the substantial impact test was "no more than the rubric under which
courts construe the terms of the APA").
69. 690 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
70. Kast Metals, 744 F.2d at 1154 n.19 (citing Cabais, 690 F.2d at 238). Although many
cases do not reflect a clear distinction among the exemptions found in § 553(b)(A), the analysis
employed for determining the exempt status of each of the three types of rules--(l) interpreta-
tive rules, (2) general statements of policy, and (3) rules of agency organization, procedure, or
practice-has, in general, developed independently. See GELLHORN & LEVIN, supra note 5,
at 317; see, e.g., Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (evaluating agency
rulemaking under each of the three possible exemptions); American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen,
834 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (same). Cabais illustrates that the evaluation of a rule can
differ substantially depending on the type of rule being considered under § 553(b)(A). Cabais,
690 F.2d at 238.
71. Kast Metals, 744 F.2d at 1154 n.19 (citing Cabais, 690 F.2d at 237-38).
72. 711 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
73. Id. at 328. Without addressing its recent departure in Cabais, the court in Lamoille
Valley articulated the appropriate test as whether a rule "'jeopardizes the rights and interests
of parties.' " Id. (quoting Batterton, 648 F.2d at 708).
74. Kast Metals, 744 F.2d at 1154 n.19 (citing Lamoille Valley, 711 F.2d at 328); see also
infra text accompanying notes 195-204.
75. The Kast Metals court, in discussing the available approaches to defining "proce-
dural," alluded to the difficulties underlying the substantial impact test. Kast Metals, 744 F.2d
at 1154 n.19. In rejecting the claims of the Kast Metals Corporation, the court addressed the
1993]
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conformance with congressional intent served to uphold the substantial im-
pact test once again.76 The Kast Metals court, in imposing the substantial
impact test, was aware of the competing interests at stake and attempted to
secure fairness and accuracy without permitting agencies to resort casually
to expedited rulemaking in reliance on one of the available exemptions. 7 In
Kast Metals, however, the court found that the OSHA instruction had "no
cognizable impact, substantial or otherwise, on any right or interest of
Kast."' 78 To require notice and comment for the OSHA regulation would
vitiate Congress' intent and, in effect, eliminate the exemption for rules of
procedure, for, as the court recognized, "[a]ll agency rules will in some way
affect those within the agency's grasp."'79
B. Looking for an Alternative: Batterton v. Marshall
The D.C. Circuit's recognition in Kast Metals that the substantial impact
test is not entirely satisfactory as a mechanism for evaluating the substan-
tive-procedural distinction80 is typical of many decisions exploring the scope
of the exemption under § 553(b)(A).81 Procedural rules, no matter how in-
potential reach of the substantial impact inquiry and conceded that "[a]ll agency rules will in
some way affect those within the agency's grasp." Id. at 1156. In contending with this ambig-
uous area of the substantial impact test, the Kast Metals court resorted to an examination of
the purposes that underlie the APA exemptions. The court characterized the substantive effect
of the OSHA instruction as "derivative" and insufficient to warrant impeding administrative
activity by imposing additional rulemaking proceedings. Id. "Administrative agencies should
not be straightjacketed by rulemaking proceedings so as to thwart the exercise of congressional
wisdom." Id. at 1156 n.22.
76. Id. at 1151-53. The court is aware of the "tension" between agency efficiency and
public participation, but seeks to accommodate congressional intent to permit abbreviated
rulemaking procedures where the rules "do not merit the administrative burdens of public
input proceedings." Id. at 1153; see Batterton, 648 F.2d at 707 n.73 ("To reach the opposite
conclusion would be to hamstring agencies in their efforts to improve their internal procedures
regarding the way they conduct their business, and rob them of virtually all flexibility in deal-
ing with increasing workloads." (quoting Hall v. EEOC, 456 F. Supp. 695, 702 (N.D. Cal.
1978)).
77. Kast Metals, 744 F.2d at 1156; see National Ass'n of Home Health Agencies v.
Schweiker, 690 F.2d 932, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1205 (1983) (cautioning
courts against freely recognizing exemptions from notice-and-comment requirements). Con-
gress addressed this issue stating that "[n]one of [the] exceptions ... is to be taken as encourag-
ing agencies not to adopt voluntary public rule making procedures where useful to the agency
or beneficial to the public." REPORT OF THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMM. ON THE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1945), reprinted in S.
Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 199 (1946) (quoted in Batterton, 648 F.2d at 701 n.28).
78. Kast Metals, 744 F.2d at 1154.
79. Id. at 1156. The regulation at issue in Kast Metals was held to represent only a minor
impact on employers; rather, "[t]he substantive effect of CPL 2.25B is purely derivative: the
source of the employers' woes is the OSH Act itself." Id.
80. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
81. American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (recognizing
that "even unambiguously procedural measures affect parties to some degree"); Neighborhood
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consequential, inevitably affect private parties within their scope in some
manner.82 In addition, the notion that the substantial impact test served to
remove some procedural rules from the scope of the exemption raised the
question of the test's validity under Vermont Yankee.83 Batterton v. Mar-
shall 84 addressed these concerns and established a shift in emphasis, moving
away from the substantial impact inquiry and focusing instead on the future
weight of the challenged rule or regulation.85
In Batterton, the state of Maryland challenged a rulemaking by the De-
partment of Labor (DOL) that modified the method for calculating unem-
ployment rates. 86 The results of these calculations provided the basis for the
allocation of funds under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
(CETA), a federally-funded program that monitored job training and place-
ment guidance.8 7 The new method, termed the "Balance of State" proce-
dure, used as its source data derived from monthly Census Bureau surveys of
sample households, ultimately adjusting the figures to meet the statistics of
the entire state.88 In contrast, the "Handbook" method, the procedure em-
ployed previously by DOL to determine Maryland's need for aid, relied on
the reports of state employment security agencies.89 When the change in
TV Co. v. FCC, 742 F.2d 629, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (acknowledging that "all procedural
requirements may and do occasionally affect substantive rights"); Rivera v. Becerra, 714 F.2d
887, 890-91 (9th Cir. 1983) (rejecting substantial impact test for purposes of determining appli-
cability of exemption under the APA); Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(rejecting substantial impact test as a means for distinguishing between interpretative and leg-
islative rules).
82. Courts generally sought to limit the potential reach of the substantial impact test. As
one court remarked, a case "which at first blush seems to relate purely to a matter of mechan-
ics, is identified as one that is not free from difficulty, and calls for judgment." Guardian Fed.
Sav. & Loan v. Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp., 589 F.2d 658, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Substan-
tial impact, therefore, does not automatically call for notice-and-comment procedures. Id.; see
also Bowen, 834 F.2d at 1046 ("[T]he mere fact that a rule may have a substantial impact 'does
not transform it into a legislative rule.' ").
83. Courts viewed it as their task to remove procedural rules from the reach of the exemp-
tion under § 553(b)(A) when a substantial impact warranted notice-and-comment rulemaking
procedures. See, e.g., Aiken v. Obledo, 442 F. Supp. 628, 649-50 (E.D. Cal. 1977) (revealing
that procedural rules with substantial impact are governed by an "exception to the exemption"
under § 553). Judicial action of this nature was specifically rejected by the Supreme Court in
Vermont Yankee. See supra note 35.
84. 648 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
85. Id. at 709 n.83.
86. Id. at 696.
87. The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, Pub. L. No. 95-524, 92 Stat. 1909
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 801-999 (1988)) (repealed 1982).
88. Batterton, 648 F.2d at 698.
89. Id. at 697.
19931
Catholic University Law Review
methodology produced a significant reduction of CETA funds, Maryland
filed suit in federal district court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.90
In its review of the lower court's decision, 9t the Batterton court held that
the agency's change in statistical methodology did not qualify for exemption
from § 553 notice-and-comment procedures. 92 Concluding that the change
was "hardly a 'routine correction or refinement,'" the court stated that the
challenged rulemaking "bears all the earmarks of conclusive agency action,
governing the rights and interests of the public." 93 Accordingly, any future
DOL action designed to alter the means by which CETA disbursements are
allocated must be implemented following the notice-and-comment proce-
dures prescribed by the APA.
94
Rather than evaluating the agency's procedures in light of the substantial
impact created by DOL's action, the Batterton court approached the issue
by considering the "legal status and effect" of the challenged rulemaking
in future judicial and administrative proceedings.9 5 The court regarded
this characterization of agency action as crucial to a proper evaluation of
the applicability of the exemption from notice and comment under
§ 553(b)(A). 96 The goals that Congress sought to achieve by imposing the
requirements of notice and comment on agencies embarking on the task of
90. Id. at 699. In addition to the allegation that DOL's rulemaking violated the pre-
scribed notice-and-comment procedures under the APA, the state also claimed that the agency
failed to meet publication requirements under CETA and the Freedom of Information Act and
that the "Balance of State" method was arbitrary and capricious. Id.
91. The court of appeals reversed the district court's decision, which upheld the agency
determination on various grounds including that the changed methodology was not a rule as
contemplated by the APA. Id. at 699.
92. Id. at 711. Although the court found that the issue concerning the specific reduction
of CETA funds had been rendered moot where the funds had already been spent and where
the state had in fact received additional discretionary DOL funds in excess of the claimed
reduction, it was nevertheless able to proceed because Maryland's stated relief was in the form
of protection from similar modifications in the future. Id. at 699.
93. Id. at 710.
94. Id. at 711.
95. Id. at 700. The court expressly distinguished its analysis from that of the substantial
impact test, stating that the" 'substantial impact' analysis does not conclude the determination
of the legal force of the agency action in future proceedings while assigning the classification of
'legislative rule'does." Id. at 709 n.83. Although the court in Batterton focused primarily on
the legal effect of an agency's activity, it noted that the substantial impact test remains a well-
established approach for determining the applicability of the exemption under § 553(b)(A) for
rules of procedure: "[W]e find no reason to doubt the continued viability of the 'substantial
impact' test, as it simply articulates one of several criteria for evaluating claims of exemption
from § 553." Id.
96. Id. at 699-700. The characterization of agency determinations according to their legal
effect contends nicely with the difficulties inherent in the substantive-procedural distinction
brought about by agency activity that typically embodies a variety of functions and purposes.
Id. at 702-03. The Batterton court illustrated its point, stating that "[a]gencies give advice,
enter contracts, stimulate inventions ... approve rates .... alleviate burdens, allocate funds,
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rulemaking provided the Batterton court with the basis for its approach.
97
Distinguishing between the "legislative" and "non-legislative" nature of
agency action permits reviewing courts to determine whether Congress in-
tended the exemption to apply.9" Where an agency is contemplating regula-
tory provisions that it intends to be legally binding on all affected parties, the
protective features of advance notice and public comment are mandated. 99
In contrast, agency actions issued without such protective features command
less deference, serving merely to notify the public of the agency's policies
and understanding of the laws, and to organize better the agency's daily
operations. oo
In addressing the exemption for procedural rules under § 553(b)(A), the
court in Batterton nevertheless employed language that distinctly resembled
the "substantial impact" test. 10 The court concluded that since the newly-
adopted statistical methodology changed the "one undefined variable in the
statutory fund allocation formula," it is governed by the standards for infor-
mal rulemaking as defined in § 553.102 The consequences of DOL's action
effectively removed this arguably procedural rule from the scope of the
exemption.
The Batterton court completed its analysis with a discussion of the court's
authority to review agency action in light of recent claims that Vermont
Yankee precludes courts from imposing procedures beyond those articulated
in the APA.' °3 Consistent with its treatment of Vermont Yankee in Kast
Metals, the court rejected the arguments advanced by DOL and held that
the warning issued by the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee was directed
at courts confronted with the issue of whether sufficient procedures accom-
panied the rulemaking process when agency compliance with APA require-
ments had already been established. " Because the claim against DOL
raised the threshold issue of whether the agency had complied with the no-
tice-and-comment procedures detailed in § 553 of the APA, Vermont Yan-
and issue statements guiding the exercise of such functions. Particular actions combine the
qualities of interpretative rules, policies, internal procedures, and legislative rules." Id. at 703.
97. Id. at 700-04.
98. Id. at 704.
99. Id. at 701-02.
100. Id. at 702 ("Such actions .... express the agency's intended course of action, its
tentative view of the meaning of a particular statutory term, or internal house-keeping meas-
ures organizing agency activities. They do not, however, foreclose alternate courses of action
or conclusively affect rights of private parties.").
101. The court stated that "where the agency action trenches on substantial private rights
and interests" and "jeopardizes [those] rights and interest[s]," such action falls outside of the
scope of the exemption for rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice. Id. at 708.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 708-09.
104. Id. at 709; see also supra text accompanying notes 65-68.
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kee simply did not apply. 15 The court concluded that construing the
statutory exemption from notice-and-comment requirements to determine
the procedural sufficiency under the APA of DOL's changed statistical
methodology is an entirely appropriate function of the court.' 6 Further-
more, by asserting that it did not rely on the substantial impact test, the
court did not need to address DOL's contention that the substantial impact
test suggests possible inappropriate judicial intervention. 10 7
C Identifying Rules that "Encode a Substantive Value Judgment":
American Hospital Association v. Bowen
As conceded by the D.C. Circuit in Batterton, the substantial impact test
continued to enjoy significant support despite its inadequacies.10 8 Yet,
courts still contended with the problem of determining the degree of sub-
stantial impact permitted under the exemption for procedural rules and Ver-
mont Yankee. 9 Seeking a more satisfactory approach to defining the scope
of the exemptions in § 553(b)(A), American Hospital Association v. Bowen 11
followed Batterton's lead: "The gradual move away from looking solely into
the substantiality of the impact reflects a candid recognition that even unam-
biguously procedural measures affect parties to some degree."'' Drawing
from Batterton, the court in American Hospital emphasized the effect of a
rule on the rights and obligations of the regulated public as Congress estab-
lished in an agency's enabling statute and distinguished these rights and obli-
gations from the incidental effects that any change in agency regulations
may produce, regardless of their substantiality.' 12 Thus, the more pointed
question posed by the court in American Hospital was "whether the agency
action also encodes a substantive value judgment or puts a stamp of approval
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 709 n.83 (referencing DOL's statement that "the 'substantial impact' test may
put a court in the posture of appearing to require procedures beyond those mandated by stat-
ute .. and in that fashion deviate from the implications of Vermont Yankee").
108. See supra note 95.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 63-68 and 103-07.
110. 834 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cited with approval in Reeder v. FCC, 865 F.2d 1298,
1305 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
I 11. American Hosp., 834 F.2d at 1047; see also Batterton, 648 F.2d at 707 ("As Professor
Freund explained decades ago, 'even office hours.., necessarily require conformity on the part
of the public.'" (quoting ERNST FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND
PROPERTY 213 (1928))).
112. American Hosp., 834 F.2d at 1047. Quoting from Batterton, the court revealed its
approach: "A useful articulation of the exemption's critical feature is that it covers agency
actions that do not themselves alter the rights or interests of parties, although it may alter the
manner in which parties present themselves or their viewpoints to the agency." Id. (quoting
Batterton, 648 F.2d at 707).
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or disapproval on a given type of behavior."'1 3 Under American Hospital,
therefore, the substantial impact test has a second prong. In the event that a
court finds that an agency's action causes a substantial impact, the court
must further determine whether that substantial impact is directly associated
with the activities, rights, or obligations that Congress intended to regulate
in establishing the agency and its powers.
In American Hospital, the court contemplated an array of rules imple-
menting the peer review organization (PRO) program established by Con-
gress in its 1982 amendment to the Medicare Act,'" 4 including three
documents that defined the procedures for the private review contractors." 15
These documents, by which the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) detailed such measures as notification of hospitals, random hospital
admission reviews, and rigid scrutiny for areas susceptible to abuse," 6 were
designed to provide the PROs with guidelines for conducting their reviews
and to draw attention to situations in which HHS expected review to be the
most productive and effective.' 1 7
The court in American Hospital rejected the American Hospital Associa-
tion's (AHA) claim that HHS had promulgated directives implementing the
1982 amendment to the Medicare Act without the notice and comment re-
113. Id. (emphasis added).
114. Peer Review Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 143, 96 Stat. 382 (1982)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c to 1320c-22 (1988)). This provision was enacted
to establish a system that effectively monitors the medical care provided to Medicare recipients
and the corresponding reimbursements obtained by the medical providers.
115. American Hosp., 834 F.2d at 1049-1052. The court ruled that three of the directives
were procedural and thus exempt from notice and comment under § 553(b)(A). The first of
these directives, PRO Manual IM85-2, established a general enforcement plan for the peer
review organizations (PROs) that monitor health care providers participating in the Medicare
program. Id. at 1049. The 70-page document provided for such enforcement standards as
requiring PROs to review at least 5% of all hospital admissions, 100% of all medical proce-
dures susceptible to abuse (e.g., unnecessary admissions), and to give notice to hospitals and
parties of the reviews being conducted. Id. The second procedural directive was PRO Manual
IM85-3, which regulated the manner and level of scrutiny that a PRO must devote to review-
ing determinations that a patient is no longer eligible for Medicare. Id. at 1051. Finally, PRO
Program Directive No. 2 established the terms that must be included in the agreement between
hospitals and their respective PRO. Id. The other documents issued by HHS in connection
with its plan to implement the 1982 Amendment and reviewed by the court in American Hos-
pital were the Request for Proposals (soliciting proposals from organizations seeking to be-
come PROs) as well as the actual contracts that were to govern the relationship between HHS
and the private organizations. Id. at 1052-57. The court exempted these documents from
notice and comment as well, characterizing them as general policy statements. Id. The dissent
praised the majority opinion but objected to the court's refusal to require notice-and-comment
procedures for the contract's stated numerical objectives which the court also identified as
general statements of policy. Id. at 1058 (Mikva, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
116. Id. at 1049 (referring to PRO Manual IM85-2).
117. Id. at 1050.
1993]
Catholic University Law Review
quired under § 553 of the APA. 118 Premising its decision upon the policy
goals behind affording notice and comment, the court sought to further pre-
serve the narrow scope of the exemptions and require agencies to follow no-
tice-and-comment procedures in all but the clearest instances in which the
exemptions apply.' 19 Yet, the challenged regulations in American Hospital
presented the court with precisely such an instance: the HHS directives con-
stituted "classic procedural rules, exempt under that distinctive prong of§ 553."120
The "encoding a substantive value judgment" language espoused in Amer-
ican Hospital sustained Batterton's emphasis on preserving the procedural
classification, a classification that Congress deliberately created.' 2' By fo-
cusing only on the interests that are ultimately at stake, namely those estab-
lished by Congress in an agency's enabling statute,12 2 the court was able to
limit the overinclusiveness of the substantial impact test and give effect to
the intended purpose of the procedural rule exemption.
The impetus for reworking the substantial impact test was derived in large
part from the 1978 Supreme Court decision in Vermont Yankee. 123 Courts
and litigants continued to struggle with Vermont Yankee's applicability to
court determinations concerning the scope of the exemptions under § 55 3.124
118. Id. at 1057.
119. Id. at 1044-45. The court in American Hospital proceeded by analyzing the chal-
lenged directives as possibly invoking the exemption for (1) interpretative rules, (2) statements
of general policy, and (3) rules of agency organization, procedure or practice. Id. at 1045-48.
It reversed the district court ruling in part because that court failed to consider "the more
relevant exemption ... for procedural rules." Id. at 1052.
120. Id. at 1050.
121. Batterton's move away from the substantial impact test reflected a need to limit that
test because of the view that courts tend to require notice and comment where a substantial
impact was deemed to exist. Recognizing that procedural rules were likely to create some
form of burden on private parties and therefore possibly a substantial impact, the Batterton
court feared that this approach might interfere with Congress' express exemption for proce-
dural rules. Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 707 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (explaining Congress'
specification for agency efficiency in promulgating procedural rules but recognizing that
"many merely internal agency practices affect parties outside the agency-often in significant
ways"); see also supra note 82 and accompanying text.
122. See Neighborhood TV Co. v. FCC, 742 F.2d 629, 637 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that
the rules designed to govern interim applications for translator licenses pending rulemaking
proceedings were procedural notwithstanding the incidental effects of a processing freeze and
modified tiered approach to selecting applications for consideration); see also Kessler v. FCC,
326 F.2d 673, 680 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ("procedural rules are those dealing with the method of
operation utilized by the Commission in the dispatch of its business").
123. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
U.S. 519 (1978); see also supra note 35.
124. See Rivera v. Becerra, 714 F.2d 887, 890 (9th Cir. 1983) (rejecting the substantial
impact test in light of Congress' express exemption in § 553 and the Supreme Court's mandate
in Vermont Yankee), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984); Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234, 237
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (interpreting Vermont Yankee to prohibit courts from imposing notice and
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The Supreme Court, in the following year, considered the fine line between a
court's obligation to insist on full compliance with APA procedures and a
court's impermissible intrusion when it substitutes what it believes to be ade-
quate procedures.125 Articulating a standard by which a court could recog-
nize when it is either disrupting or maintaining this "balance,"' 26 however,
became troublesome in light of the ambiguity in defining the term "proce-
dural." In American Hospital, the court revealed its intention to define pro-
cedural rules as those that "do not themselves alter the rights or interests of
parties, although [they] may alter the manner in which parties present them-
selves or their viewpoints to the agency." 127
D. One Step Forward or Two Steps Back: Air Transport Association of
America v. Department of Transportation
1. The Right to Avail Oneself of an Administrative Adjudication
The Batterton and American Hospital courts were guided by Vermont
Yankee and the desire to preserve the express exemption for rules of proce-
dure. These objectives, however, necessarily infringed upon the court's abil-
ity to provide procedural protections where it viewed the need for public
participation as paramount. Attempting to regain a foothold over this area,
the D.C. Circuit formulated yet another approach to resolving the issue of
the scope of the exemption under § 553(b)(A) in Air Transport Association of
America v. Department of Transportation.12 Inquiring whether the chal-
lenged Rules of Practice "substantially affect civil penalty defendants' 'right
to avail [themselves] of an administrative adjudication,' "129 the court reas-
serted its authority to review the scope of the exemption and invalidated the
challenged regulatory action for inadequate procedural compliance. 13
0
comment based on substantial impact alone). But see Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Department
of Transp., 900 F.2d 369, 378 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (noting that Vermont Yankee is incor-
rectly invoked by the dissent because it presupposes compliance with § 553 and its exemption),
vacated, 111 S. Ct. 944 (1991); Association of Nat'l Advertisers v. FTC, 617 F.2d 611, 629 &
n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (dismissing plaintiffs' claim that the substantial impact test is no longer
valid under Vermont Yankee). See generally DAVIS, supra note 1, § 6:35-6:39, at 216 (ques-
tioning the "sweeping dictum" of Vermont Yankee in light of subsequent Supreme Court deci-
sions that impose procedural requirements in addition to APA procedures).
125. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 313 (1979).
126. Id.
127. American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting Bat-
terton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 707 (D.C. Cir. 1980)); see also Neighborhood TV Co. v.
FCC, 742 F.2d 629, 637 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (relying on the same language in its examination of
the substantive-procedural distinction).
128. 900 F.2d 369, 372 (D.C. Cir. 1990), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 944 (1991).
129. Id. (quoting National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 90,
96 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd, 393 U.S. 18 (1968)).
130. See infra text accompanying notes 158-61.
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Judge Edwards, writing for the majority in Air Transport, invalidated
rules promulgated without notice and comment by the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA). 3 ' The regulations at issue in Air Transport 132 pro-
vided for the manner in which the FAA was to prosecute violations of the
Federal Aviation Act under the expanded enforcement authority granted by
Congress in its Civil Penalty Assessment Demonstration Program legisla-
tion.' 33 As the agency explained, the Rules of Practice embodied "the pro-
cedures utilized to enforce the FAA's substantive aviation safety regulations
in the smaller civil penalty cases."' 3 4 The regulations served to bring its
existing procedural rules into conformance with the more formal, trial-like
procedures of notice and hearing under § 554 of the APA, which Congress
explicitly required for all civil penalty actions. 35 No longer required to sub-
mit findings to the United States Attorney for prosecution of civil penalty
131. Air Transport, 900 F.2d at 381.
132. 53 Fed. Reg. 34646-65, 34656 (Sept. 7, 1988) (codified at 14 C.F.R. Part 13, Subpart
G).
133. Airport and Airway Safety and Capacity Expansion Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-
223, Title II, § 204(g) 101 Stat. 1486, 1520-21 (December 30, 1987) (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C. § 1475 (1988 & Supp. 111990)) (amending the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C.
§§ 1301-1557). Increasing the enforcement power of the FAA under the Federal Aviation
Act, the Act enabled the agency to assess civil penalties and to conduct administrative adjudi-
cations for violations of the Federal Aviation Act as well as rules, regulations, and orders
issued by the FAA. 49 U.S.C. § 1475(a). Civil penalty actions in excess of $50,000, however,
would remain in the hands of the United States Attorney for prosecution in United States
district courts. Id. at § 1475(c). The amendment required the agency to establish a Civil
Penalty Assessment Demonstration Program to monitor the amendment's effectiveness over a
two-year period and to report its findings to Congress within that time. Pub. L. No. 100-223,
§ 204(i)(2) (1987) (uncodified). Subsequent to the enactment, the FAA promulgated the Rules
of Practice for FAA Civil Penalty Actions which articulate the detailed procedures for civil
penalty adjudications. Rules of Practice for FAA Civil Penalty Actions, 14 C.F.R. § 13
(1988). Congress determined the appropriate level of formality governing such proceedings in
the 1987 legislation which prescribed a hearing on the record as established in § 554 of the
APA. The Air Transport Association challenged these Rules of Practice in the Air Transport
case, and the Court of Appeals as a result held them invalid in its review of the final rule.
134. Brief for the Respondents at 3, Air Transport, 900 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (No. 89-
1195) (emphasis omitted).
135. Section 1475(d)(1) provides that "[a] civil penalty may be assessed under this section
only after notice and opportunity for a hearing on the record in accordance with section 554
[of the APA]." 49 U.S.C. § 1475 (d)(l). The legislative history reveals the purposes behind
this requirement:
First, the requirement is intended to advise the FAA of the appropriate level of pro-
cedural formality and attention to the rights of those assessed civil penalties under
this demonstration program. Secondly, this requirement is intended to provide rea-
sonable assurance to the potential subjects of such civil penalties that their due pro-
cess rights are not compromised.
Brief for Petitioner at 20, Air Transport, 900 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (No. 89-1195) (quoting
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 484, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2656).
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actions under $50,000,136 the FAA published the Rules of Practice in their
final form and for immediate adoption on September 7, 1988, announcing
the inadequacy of its existing rules and the temporary nature of the enforce-
ment authority as grounds for proceeding without the notice-and-comment
period. 137 Governing such aspects of the civil penalty action as filing of the
complaint, service of documents, discovery, evidence, record, and appeals,
the Rules of Practice encompass the necessary and available agency proce-
dures once a party charged with a violation has requested a hearing. 38
Representing the interests of private airlines, the Air Transport Associa-
tion of America (Air Transport or Association) challenged the Rules of
Practice following notice of final agency action in the Federal Register.1
39
Air Transport claimed that the rules imposed a significant hardship on its
members currently engaged in litigating actions before the FAA.'" Citing
numerous instances where the Rules favor the agency, the Association ar-
gued that no equivalent beneficial features were afforded to parties defending
136. As reported by the Department of Transportation, the Civil Penalty Assessment
Demonstration Program:
gives the FAA statutory authority which will better enable [it] to prosecute airlines
which cut corners on maintenance, to prosecute general aviation pilots who fly
through restricted areas and risk not only their own lives, but more importantly, the
lives of many, many others; and to prosecute those who violate airport security laws.
... We as passengers do not see the myriad of hoses, switches, [and] other equip-
ment which must work perfectly for the planes to get off the ground, to perform
flawlessly in flight, and then to land safely. This amendment provides an incentive
for airlines to ensure that these systems are maintained at the highest of standards.
Brief for the Respondents at 5-6, Air Transport, 900 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (No. 89-1195)
(quoting 133 CONG. REC. S15293-94 (daily ed. October 28, 1987) (statement of Sen. Wilson)).
137. 53 Fed. Reg. 34653. The Civil Penalty Assessment Demonstration Program granted
the FAA increased prosecutorial power for a limited two-year period taking effect on Decem-
ber 31, 1987. 49 U.S.C. § 1475(d)(4) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
138. 53 Fed. Reg. 34655-65. Following receipt of notice of proposed civil penalty, the
individual charged has three options as to how to proceed: (1) pay the amount of the penalty
upon which the FAA will issue a civil penalty order; (2) engage in informal settlement pro-
ceedings with the FAA; or (3) request a hearing before an administrative law judge. Id. at
34654-55 (codified at 14 C.F.R. § 13.16(e)-(1)).
139. Brief for Petitioner at 20, Air Transport, 900 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (No. 89-1195).
The claims of the Association were also the subject of a hearing held before the Subcommittee
on Aviation in 1989 where members of the aviation community and experts in the field of
administrative law testified concerning the FAA Rules of Practice and the "consternation...
over what some others think of perhaps as a dry procedural issue." The Civil Penalty Assess-
ment Demonstration Program of the Federal Aviation Administration: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Aviation of the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. 137 (1989) (statement of Robert J. Aaronson, President, Air Transport Association of
America).
140. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Air Transport, 900 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (No. 89-1195)
(citing the harmful publicity and the exorbitant costs of defending against alleged violations as
its impetus for seeking to suspend administrative adjudications pending judicial review of the
final rule).
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against cited violations. 4 ' In the words of the Association, the Rules of
Practice "create[d] unparalleled bias in favor of the agency in litigation of
penalty cases."' 42 Contending that the interests of the public require proce-
dural conformance with § 553, the Association argued that the burdens that
the rules impose on defending parties would subject airlines to a greater like-
lihood of an increased penalty assessment, resulting in sufficient prejudice to
warrant the imposition of public participation through notice-and-comment
procedures. 14 3 Thus, in addition to substantive claims that the rules violated
due process rights and the FAA's enabling statute, the Association sought to
compel compliance with the required notice-and-comment procedures of
§ 553.' 44 The agency defended its action by characterizing the Rules of
Practice as procedural and by advancing its post-promulgation consideration
of industry comment. 
45
The court in Air Transport recognized the inadequacies of a substantive-
procedural distinction' 46 and adhered to a line of cases employing a "func-
tional analysis" instead.'4 7 Focusing on the fact that the challenged proce-
dures implicate the defendant's rights in a civil penalty hearing, the court
141. Air Transport challenged eight provisions specifically: (1) issuance of an Order of
Civil Penalty prior to a hearing under 14 C.F.R. §§ 13.16(h), 13.202 (1988); (2) lack of separa-
tion of investigatory and adjudicatory functions under § 13.203; (3) unequal use of formal
admissions under § 13.220(1)(3); (4) disparate use of opinion testimony under § 13.227; (5)
unequal protection from hearsay testimony under § 13.227; (6) limitation on relevant factual
evidence not directly related to the incident or violation under § 13.227; (7) prohibition on
written arguments during or after the hearing including motions and proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law under § 13.231; (8) special accountability of administrative law judges
following any reduction of civil penalty under § 13.232. See Brief for Petitioner at 20-43, Air
Transport, 900 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (No. 89-1195).
142. Id. at 20.
143. Id. at 46-48. The Association analogized the Rules of Practice to the "formalized
criteria adopted by an agency to determine whether claims for relief are meritorious" as stated
in Pickus. Id. at 47 (quoting Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1113 (D.C.
Cir. 1974)).
144. Id. at 47 (Challenging the rules on the grounds of noncompliance with due process,
APA minimum requirements, and the agency's authorizing statute, Air Transport claimed
that public participation in the form of notice and comment was essential where "[t]he Rule
was specifically designed to influence penalty decisions"). Id.
145. Brief for the Respondents at 45-49, Air Transport, 900 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (No.
89-1195). The FAA also submitted § 553(b)(B), exempting agency action from notice and
comment where "good cause" is indicated, as justification for proceeding without standard
rulemaking procedures. Id. at 49; see also supra note 13.
146. See supra text accompanying note 33.
147. Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Department of Transp., 900 F.2d 369, 375-76 (D.C. Cir.
1990), vacated, I I1 S. Ct. 944 (1991). The "functional analysis" upon which the Air Transport
court relied focuses on the nature of the resulting consequences of agency action, such as when
opportunities are foreclosed or entitlements jeopardized. Id. (citing Reeder v. FCC, 865 F.2d
1298, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (per curiam); Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 707-08 (D.C.
Cir. 1980); Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
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held that "[t]he Penalty Rules ...affect the entire range of adjudicatory
rights guaranteed by the due process clause, the APA and [the Demonstra-
tion Program]-matters far too important to be withdrawn from public de-
liberation." 14 The majority relied heavily on prior law requiring notice and
comment for agency action that disrupts the availability of administrative
hearings and cited the court's holding in National Motor Freight Traffic
Association v. United States as controlling.' 49 The nature of the rules alone
and their potential consequences provide the relevant inquiry for determin-
ing whether the exemption from informal rulemaking procedures under
§ 553(b)(A) applies.' 50 The court thus narrowly construed the exemption
for rules of procedure, removing from its scope all rules that pertain to a
party's right to an administrative hearing.' 5'
The court in Air Transport reasoned that because the FAA Rules of Prac-
tice were directed at the administrative hearings in which the agency im-
poses civil penalties for aviation safety violations,' 52 courts must use
particular care in discerning the validity of the challenged rulemaking. 53
An agency can easily manipulate procedures such as the Rules of Practice,
leaving the defendant in a vulnerable position.' 4 Considering this potential
for bias, the court explained that "the FAA made discretionary-indeed, in
many cases, highly contentious--choices concerning what process civil pen-
alty defendants are due.'" 55 Interpreting American Hospital to preclude this
type of administrative action without the procedural precautions of public
participation, the court likened the FAA regulations to those that "encode[ ]
a substantive value judgment."' 56 The court did, however, recognize the
exemption for procedural rules as a valuable means of accomplishing organi-
zational matters within an agency, but limited the use of the exemption to
"housekeeping measure[s].' 157
148. Air Transport, 900 F.2d at 377.
149. 900 F.2d 369 passim. The court even adopted the language of National Motor Freight
as the essential inquiry for determining § 553(b)(A) applicability. See, e.g., id. at 372, 376-77,
381 (quoting National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 90 (D.D.C.
1967) (three-judge court), aff'd, 393 U.S. 18 (1968)).
150. See, e.g., id. at 377.
151. Id. at 378.
152. See supra note 133.
153. Air Transport, 900 F.2d at 376 (citing National Ass'n of Home Health Agencies v.
Schweiker, 690 F.2d 932, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1205 (1983); Brown
Express, Inc. v. United States, 607 F.2d 695, 702-03 (5th Cir. 1979)).
154. The Air Transport court was careful to note in expressing its astonishment over FAA's
choices concerning the Rules of Practice that it in no way questioned the legality of those
choices. Id. at 376 n.8.
155. Id.
156. Id. (construing American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1047 (D.C. Cir.
1987)).
157. Id. (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 310 (1979)).
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The Air Transport formulation sought to put an end to the uncertainty left
unaddressed by Vermont Yankee and to reaffirm the court's function of re-
view over administrative agencies, in particular when a defendant's adjudica-
tory rights are implicated.1 58 In response to the dissenting view in Air
Transport, which advocated the procedural nature of the penalty rules, the
court noted only briefly that reliance on Vermont Yankee is misplaced where
the issue is confined to determining compliance with the APA.159 Further-
more, congressional intent can only be properly observed when courts scruti-
nize the procedural adequacy of regulatory activity that affects the rights of
the regulated public, unlike the more arbitrary procedural-substantive dis-
tinction, which focuses on "classes of rights."'" In other words, the major-
ity contends that looking at the degree of substantial impact is altogether
inappropriate and that only internal agency procedures of no conceivable
interest to the public fall within the ambit of the exemption for rules of
agency organization, procedure, or practice. The Air Transport court's re-
jection of the substantive-procedural distinction represents a significant de-
parture from previous case law, which generally acknowledged the
158. See supra note 35.
159. Air Transport, 900 F.2d at 378 n.13. Judge Edwards noted that Vermont Yankee and
its mandate to reviewing courts to refrain from imposing procedural requirements not listed in
the APA were inapplicable where such a court has the obligation of assessing compliance with
APA requirements. See also supra text accompanying notes 103-04. "Section 553 of the APA
expressly directs agencies to engage in notice and comment rulemaking; the issue in this case is
whether the FAA had any ground to disregard this procedural obligation." Air Transport, 900
F.2d at 378 n.13 (emphasis omitted).
160. Id. at 378 (citing American Hosp., 834 F.2d at 1041, 1047). Judge Edwards stated for
the majority that "[t]he characterizations 'substantive' and 'procedural'-no more here than
elsewhere in the law-do not guide inexorably to the right result, nor do they really advance
the inquiry very far." Id. (quoting National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 268
F. Supp. 90, 96 (D.D.C. 1967) (three-judge court), aff'd, 393 U.S. 18 (1968)). The court
further reasoned that the substantive-procedural distinction misses the point, for the exemp-
tion under § 553 refers not only to rules of procedure, but rather, to rules of organization,
procedure, or practice collectively. Id. But see National Motor Freight, 268 F. Supp. at 96, for
a discussion of the origin of the substantive-procedural distinction. In National Motor Freight,
the court traced the term "substantive" to the Attorney General's Manual on the Administra-
tive Procedure Act which defined that term in its discussion of the applicability of § 553 infor-
mal rulemaking procedures:
Substantive rules-rules ... issued by an agency pursuant to statutory authority and
which implement the statute, as, for example, the proxy rules issued by the Securities
and Exchange Commission pursuant to section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 .... Such rules have the force and effect of law.
Id. at 97 (quoting the ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 2, at 423 n.3); see also
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-03 & nn.31-32 (1979) (relying on the Attorney
General's Manual); id. at 301 ("The central distinction among agency regulations found in the
APA is that between 'substantive rules' on the one hand and 'interpretative rules, general
statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice' on the other.").
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difficulties inherent in the substantive-procedural distinction, but neverthe-
less adhered consistently to its basic mandate. 61
2. The Primary Conduct Test
In sharp contrast, Judge Silberman's dissenting opinion admonished the
majority for dispensing with the statutory mandate to distinguish between
substantive and procedural rules.' 62 To effectuate congressional intent,
Judge Silberman suggested that the penalty rules be upheld because they
bear on the procedures to be followed in civil penalty hearings rather than
on aviation safety directly. 6 3 The dissent further reasoned that the Supreme
Court in Vermont Yankee clearly cautioned reviewing courts against impos-
ing procedural protections in addition to those required under the APA.1
64
The dissent found force in the contention that courts are not at leisure to
disregard the substantive-procedural distinction upon which the APA ex-
emption rests.' 65 "Congress ... made that difference critical, and we are
therefore obliged to implement a viable distinction between 'procedural'
rules and those that are substantive." 166 The viable distinction that Judge
Silberman formulated assigns to the term "substantive" all rules that affect
primary conduct and designates all those at the periphery as "proce-
dural."' 67 Accordingly, the inquiry must be whether "a given regulation
161. See, e.g., Neighborhood TV Co. v. FCC, 742 F.2d 629, 637 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating
that "[c]ourts have not had an easy time deciding whether particular agency rules were 'proce-
dural' or 'substantive' "); United States Dep't of Labor v. Kast Metals Corp., 744 F.2d 1145,
1152 (5th Cir. 1984) (conceding that "the distinction between a rule of procedure and one of
substance is not black and white"); Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 701-03 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (comparing substantive and non-binding rules while acknowledging that infinite varia-
tions of agency activity defy neat characterization); Brown Express, Inc. v. United States, 607
F.2d 695, 701 (5th Cir. 1979) (finding that the terms "substantive" and "procedural" "are
legal conclusions which depend upon their settings for definition"); Aiken v. Obledo, 442 F.
Supp. 628, 649 (E.D. Cal. 1977) (holding that the collateral contact rule issued by the United
States Department of Agriculture "does not squarely fall within either the 'procedural' or the
'substantive' categories [sic]"); Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Finch, 307 F. Supp. 858, 863 (D.
Del. 1970) (stating that "[a]ttempting to provide a facile semantic distinction ... does little to
clarify whether the regulations here involved are subject to the notice and comment provisions
... of the [APA]").
162. Air Transport, 900 F.2d at 381 (Silberman, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 382 (stating that the Rules of Practice fit within the exemption under
§ 553(b)(A) because they "deal with enforcement or adjudication of claims of violations of the
substantive norm but ... do not purport to affect the substantive norm").
164. Id. at 383 (citing generally Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978)).
165. Id. at 381.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 382 (citing Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 164 (1967)). "Pri-
mary conduct" has also been used in contending with the difficulties surrounding the substan-
tive-procedural distinction embodied in the Erie Doctrine based on the landmark case of Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Most notably, Justice Harlan employed the term "pri-
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purports to direct, control, or condition the behavior of those institutions or
individuals subject to regulation by the authorizing statute" thereby render-
ing it substantive in nature and subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking
procedures.' 68 As for the FAA Rules of Practice, these exemplify "by ample
measure" the type of rules that a court should classify as procedural and
therefore sustain, even if promulgated without the notice and comment de-
lineated in § 553.169
Judge Silberman, relying on American Hospital, conceded that agency ac-
tivity may not always fall neatly into the categories of "substantive" or "pro-
cedural." 7 ' The decision in American Hospital managed to isolate success-
fully the procedural nature of the challenged rulemaking even though the
PRO directives were likely to cause hospitals to experience increased costs
and treat certain medical procedures with reluctance.' 7 ' Only rulemaking
activity that implicates directly the subject matter of the congressional act-
here, the safety standards prescribed by Congress in the Federal Aviation
Act and its amendments-must fall within the substantive arena obligating
careful collaboration with interested members of the public.' 72 The dissent
concluded that enforcement schemes and systems for adjudicating claims
should remain in the procedural arena and should not be removed merely
because regulated parties seek to protect the status quo. 1 3 Judge Silberman
criticized the majority for its concern with sorting out the "important" rules
for purposes of determining the applicability of notice and comment. Con-
gress by its exemption deemed the informal rulemaking procedures unneces-
sary for certain rules, not because of their lack of importance, but because
agency effectiveness and efficiency superseded the need for procedural
protections. 1
74
mary conduct" in his concurring opinion in Hannah v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 477 (1965)
(Harlan, J., concurring), as a gloss on the substantive-procedural distinction. See also EUGENE
F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3-36, at 110 (1982), for a discussion of the
Erie Doctrine. See generally John H. Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REV.
693 (1974) (discussing the Erie line of cases and attributing the continued importance of the
Erie Doctrine in part to Justice Harlan's concurrence in Hannah v. Plumer).
168. Air Transport, 900 F.2d at 382.
169. Id. at 381.
170. Id. at 383. See supra text accompanying notes 108-27.
171. Id.
172. Id. By comparison, the substantial impact test as applied in Kast Metals looks to see
only whether a given regulation "goes beyond formality and substantially affects the rights of
those over whom the agency exercises authority." Pickus v. United States Board of Parole,
507 F.2d 1107, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see supra text accompanying notes 46-79.
173. Air Transport, 900 F.2d at 382.
174. Id.; see also supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
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II. THE EFFECT OF THE AIR TRANSPORT RULING ON THE EXEMPTION
FOR RULES OF AGENCY ORGANIZATION, PROCEDURE, OR
PRACTICE
The Air Transport decision left in its wake considerable uncertainty as to
the appropriate method for determining the scope of § 553(b)(A).1 75 The
decision imposes an even greater task on agencies which must now consider
the validity of conflicting approaches if they wish to determine whether the
notice-and-comment requirements of § 553 apply. 176 Agencies, in an at-
tempt to avoid the consequences of judicial review and the potential invali-
dation of their rulemaking, will likely promulgate procedural rules with the
full panoply of prescribed procedures under the APA. 7 7 This reaction is
contrary to Congressional intent, which by explicit exemptions sought to
encourage agency action in certain areas where the need for notice and com-
ment was considered to be dispensable.1 71
Judge Silberman aptly characterized the source of the ambiguity sur-
rounding the exemption for rules of agency organization, procedure, or prac-
tice in his description of agency rulemaking as a "continuum" on which
some rules clearly find themselves at either the substantive or the procedural
end. 79 This approach categorizes as "substantive" those rules that directly
affect the activity over which Congress granted the agency regulatory au-
thority, in direct contrast to "procedural" rules, which govern subsidiary
agency activity such as the enforcement or adjudication of claims. 8 ' How-
ever, as the Rules of Practice challenged in Air Transport demonstrate, many
175. The Air Transport decision, although subsequently vacated and dismissed, revealed
the controversy surrounding the issue and the uncertainty with which agencies must contend.
See, e.g., Tracy C. Hauser, Survey, The Administrative Procedure Act, Procedural Rule Excep-
tion to the Notice and Comment Requirement-A Survey of Cases, 5 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 519,
550 (1991).
176. See supra text accompanying notes 41-45; Jeffrey S. Lubbers & Nancy G. Miller, The
APA Procedural Rule Exemption: Looking For a Way to Clear the Air, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U.
481, 489-93 (1992) (responding to the Hauser Article and arguing that Judge Silberman's "pri-
mary conduct" test represents "an improvment on the tests that currently exist" and that
agencies should voluntarily engage in notice-and-comment procedures for procedural rules
where attendant costs do not outweigh the benefits).
177. The court in Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1980), suggested that
simply the appearance of "fair consideration" and the desire to reduce the amount of litigation
provide a considerable incentive for using notice-and-comment procedures. Id. at 701 n.28.
178. Id. at 704 (announcing that "[e]xemptions should be recognized only where the need
for public participation is overcome by good cause to suspend it, or where the need is too small
to warrant it"); see also supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
179. Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Department of Transp., 900 F.2d 369, 382 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (Silberman, J., dissenting), vacated, Ill S. Ct. 944 (1991); see also EDLES & NELSON,
supra note 2, at 66-67 ("The likelihood that a regulation will pass muster as 'procedural' is in
direct proportion to its insignificance").
180. Air Transport, 900 F.2d at 382.
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rules do not fit at either end of the continuum, and, because of their conten-
tious nature, fall into an ambiguous area where the two characteristics over-
lap.'' While none of the judicial approaches conclusively resolves the
ambiguity surrounding procedural rules, the approach articulated in Ameri-
can Hospital, excluding from the notice-and-comment exemption those rules
which "also encode[ ] a substantive value judgment," proposes the more rea-
sonable solution to defining the scope of § 553(b)(A).8 2
The substantial impact test, as the precursor to the American Hospital
formulation, remains a valuable source of insight for making sense of the
exemption under § 553(b)(A) and the substantive-procedural distinction
which governs that exemption for rules of procedure. s3 While the substan-
tial impact test remains important to the substantive-procedural distinction,
it has not managed to escape entirely unscathed. "[T]he continued viability
of the 'substantial impact' test, as it simply articulates one of several criteria
for evaluating claims of exemption from § 553" was recognized by the D.C.
Circuit in Batterton. 8 Yet the Batterton court relied on an alternative
method for making sense of the substantive-procedural distinction, looking
rather to the judicial weight to be accorded agency action under the exemp-
tion.'85 By classifying rules as legislative and non-legislative, the Batterton
court emphasized "the legal force of the agency action in future proceed-
ings.""" Notice-and-comment procedures elevate legislative rules and make
them less susceptible to criticism and legal action.'87 Only if promulgated in
a manner that a court deems "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law" will the notice-and-comment regu-
lation be set aside.' 8 On the other hand, non-legislative rules, such as rules
of procedure, gather force over time, acquiring precedential value only upon
surviving judicial scrutiny, and at the outset "carry no more weight on judi-
181. Id.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 108-27.
183. Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 708-09 n.83 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cited with approval
in Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (evaluating the impact of Vermont
Yankee on the substantial impact test).
184. Batterton, 648 F.2d at 708-09 n.83.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 111-12.
186. Batterton, 648 F.2d at 708-09 n.83 (citing Joseph v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n,
554 F.2d 1140, 1154 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
187. Guardian Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp., 589 F.2d 658,
662 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The court in Guardian Federal discussed the underlying policy reasons
of § 553 stating that "[pl]ublic rulemaking procedures increase the likelihood of administrative
responsiveness to the needs and concerns of those affected. And the procedure for public
participation tends to promote acquiescence in the result even when objections remain as to
substance." Id., quoted in American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 707
F.2d 548, 565 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984).
188. Batterton, 648 F.2d at 702 (quoting the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)(1976)); see gener-
ally DAVIS, supra note 1, § 6:6.
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cial review than their inherent persuasiveness commands."' 9 The Batterton
court was thus able to resolve some of the problems of the substantial impact
test raised since Vermont Yankee.' 90
Additional decisions revealed the courts' reluctance to rely on the sub-
stantial impact test. The Ninth Circuit rejected the test as the appropriate
inquiry governing issues of exemption for rules of procedure,1 9' but the D.C.
Circuit's decision in Cabais had a more lasting effect when it discarded the
test as the method for ascertaining a rule's interpretative status.' 92 An inter-
pretative rule announces "what the administrative officer thinks the statute
or regulation means."' 93 Courts do not evaluate these interpretative rules
under § 553(b)(A) according to the substantial impact of the agency inter-
pretation, but rather according to an agency's intent to issue a legislative rule
and the presence of "gaps" requiring interstitial rulemaking in conjunction
with notice and comment.'
94
The D.C. Circuit abandoned the substantial impact test in the context of
interpretative rules based on its recognition that, by their very nature, such
rules may "vitally affect private interests."'9 " In Cabais, the court justified
its decision to forego notice and comment, even in the presence of a substan-
tial impact, by stating that "strict adherence to the letter of the APA with-
189. Batterton, 648 F.2d at 702 (citation omitted).
190. See supra text accompanying notes 95-107.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
192. See supra text accompanying note 69. The substantial impact test continues to apply
to general statements of policy, also exempted under section 553(b)(A) from notice-and-com-
ment procedures.
193. Brown Express, Inc. v. United States, 607 F.2d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1979) (quoting
Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194 F.2d 329, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1952)). Relying on Gibson Wine, the
court in American Hospital summarized the difference between interpretative rules which "ex-
plain ambiguous terms in legislative enactments" and legislative rules "which create law, usu-
ally implementary to an existing law." American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
194. American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 707 F.2d 548, 559
(D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984) (characterizing rule which calculates re-
tirement benefits as interpretative although it reduces substantially the amount of benefits re-
ceived by 113,000 postal workers); see also Rivera v. Becerra, 714 F.2d 887, 891 (9th Cir.
1983) (rejecting substantial impact test for rules interpreting pension offset rules); Cabais v.
Egger, 690 F.2d 234, 237-38 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (concluding that rule requiring offset of pension
income by unemployment benefits is interpretative). The substantial impact test, however, did
at one time predominate in the determination of exemption for interpretative rules as a means
of effectuating the goals of § 553 notice and comment. See, e.g., Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v.
Finch, 307 F. Supp. 858, 863 (D. Del. 1970) (invalidating retroactive regulations that required
additional evidence for the approval of marketed drug products because of the substantial
impact on pharmaceutical companies).
195. Cabais, 690 F.2d at 237. Not all circuits have arrived at the same conclusion as the
District of Columbia Circuit. See, e.g., American Bancorporation v. Board of Governors of
Fed. Reserve Sys., 509 F.2d 29, 33 (8th Cir. 1974) (regarding the challenged rule's impact as
the crucial inquiry in determining its substantive or interpretative nature).
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out reference to 'elementary fairness' " is paramount where Congress ex-
pressly designated interpretative rules for expedited rulemaking.' 96 The al-
ternative methods for obtaining relief tend to mitigate the harshness of the
rule espoused by the Cabais court.'9 7 Injured parties, the court explained,
can seek judicial relief from the adverse effects of interpretative rules in re-
lated enforcement proceedings.198 Furthermore, courts in such enforcement
proceedings generally do not grant the deference that accompanies notice-
and-comment rulemaking to interpretative rules where an agency has opted
to forego public input in favor of immediate promulgation and accelerated
effectiveness.' 99 These reasons provided ample justification for the Cabais
court to adopt the more lenient test for interpretative rules, notwithstanding
the precedent that supports the substantial impact test.
The courts, however, were not inclined to follow the same approach for
rules of agency procedure.2°' Lamoille Valley, a subsequent decision by the
D.C. Circuit, continued to rely on the substantial impact test for analyzing
the substantive-procedural distinction.2"' Following that decision, other
courts reasserted the substantial impact test as a strong influence in cases
concerning rules of agency procedure.20 2 The "encod[ing] a substantive
value judgment" language of American Hospital basically preserved the sub-
stantial impact test, although it broadened the inquiry to avoid losing the
exemption entirely.2" 3 For as the court in that case recognized, under the
196. Cabais, 690 F.2d at 237-38 n.6. (citing Independent Broker-Dealers Trade Ass'n v.
SEC, 442 F.2d 132, 144 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 828 (1971)).
197. See Cabais, 690 F.2d at 237-38 n.6; see also supra note 33 and accompanying text.
198. Id. For example, in the context of the FAA Rules of Practice, the FAA argued that
the issue of the validity of its rulemaking was premature. Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Depart-
ment of Transp., 900 F.2d 369, 374 (D.C. Cir. 1990), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 944 (1991). Rather,
the appropriate opportunity for challenging the rules adheres when the agency has applied the
rules in a specific enforcement proceeding. Id.
199. Cabais, 690 F.2d at 237-38 n.6. Courts may defer to agencies but are not constrained
to adopt the challenged agency interpretation. American Postal Workers Union v. United
States Postal Serv., 707 F.2d 548, 561 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
200. See, e.g., Air Transport, 900 F.2d at 375 (substantial effect on civil penalty defendants'
rights implicates notice and comment); American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1047
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (substantial impact test provides basis for new formulation); United States
Dep't of Labor v. Kast Metals Corp., 744 F.2d 1145, 1154 n.19 (5th Cir. 1984) (substantial
impact test applies to procedural rules); Lamoille Valley R.R. v. ICC, 711 F.2d 295, 328 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (substantive consequences determine eligibility for exemption).
201. Lamoille Valley, 711 F.2d at 328. The court stated the test without acknowledging
the Cabais decision or its reasoning. Id. This suggests considerable independence between
interpretative rules and rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice for the purpose of
evaluating the applicability of the exemption provision.
202. See cases cited supra note 200.
203. American Hosp., 834 F.2d at 1047. The American Hospital court elaborated on the
substantial impact inquiry, acknowledging the fact "that even unambiguously procedural
measures affect parties to some degree," and curbed the tendency of the substantial impact test
[Vol. 42:313
Air Transport Association of America
substantial impact test, procedural rules will likely not qualify for the ex-
emption under § 553(b)(A) because of their inevitable impact.2" The Amer-
ican Hospital test, like the decision in Cabais rejecting the substantial impact
test for interpretative rules, rested upon the notion that rules under the ex-
emption are likely to affect substantially the interests of private parties.2"5
The American Hospital decision illustrates the D.C. Circuit's move away
from the substantial impact test.2°6 Concluding that the claims of the chal-
lenging party were not legitimate where the concern for a greater likelihood
of discovering excessive reimbursements was exactly that which the Medi-
care amendment sought to achieve, the court brought the HHS documents
within the scope of the exemption for procedural rules despite the substan-
tial impact that the complaining hospitals anticipated. 2 7  But only the
broadened inquiry of whether the challenged procedural rule "also encodes a
substantive value judgment or puts a stamp of approval or disapproval on a
given type of behavior" serves to bring the PRO manuals within the scope of
the exemption, since it was undisputed that hospitals inside the PRO territo-
ries would perceive the effect of heightened scrutiny under the modified en-
forcement scheme. 20 ' The American Hospital formulation thus effectively
limited the substantial impact test and its potential reach, placing the proce-
dural directives promulgated by HHS within the express exemption that
Congress deemed appropriate.
Like the PRO directives in American Hospital, the FAA Rules of Practice
challenged in Air Transport speak to the procedures accompanying the
FAA's enforcement scheme. Whereas American Hospital dealt with rules
governing the investigatory and supervisory aspects of enforcement,2"9 the
Air Transport rules provide the procedures for the hearing stage of a civil
penalty action. The FAA Rules of Practice do not alter the standards of
safety compliance, and thus indirectly the behavior of the member airlines of
the Air Transport Association, the crucial "substantive value judgment"
to impose indiscriminately notice and comment on procedural rules. Id. See supra text ac-
companying note 113.
204. American Hosp., 834 F.2d at 1047.
205. Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("Interpretative and substantive
rules may both vitally affect private interests .... ").
206. See supra text accompanying note 111.
207. American Hosp., 834 F.2d at 1051. The court conceded that Manual IM85-2 might
burden health care providers with the unconditional compliance that increased enforcement
suggests, but it went so far as to qualify that claim as "patently illegitimate" for objecting to
measures which expose violations of the Medicare Act. Id.
208. See id. at 1047, 1051 (characterizing the effects of the HHS enforcement scheme as
"incidental mechanical burdens").
209. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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called for in American Hospital.2"' As suggested by the court in Cabais, the
Air Transport Association has other means of seeking redress.2 11 Judicial
review after an administrative adjudication concerning specific violations of
the Federal Aviation Act or its enabling regulations provides disgruntled
parties with the valuable safeguard needed to protect against inadequacies
resulting from abbreviated rulemaking.2 12 Furthermore, rules promulgated
without notice and comment are not entitled to special deference from re-
viewing courts.21 3 These alternative protections served as justification for
abandoning the substantial impact test for interpretative rules and should be
equally significant in the context of procedural rules.
For these reasons, the FAA Rules of Practice would likely survive the
American Hospital inquiry, a result contrary to the Air Transport decision
itself.21 4  While the Air Transport case continues to carry precedential
value,2 15 the methodology it uses to determine the procedural weight of the
Rules of Practice is sufficiently flawed to render future prominence unlikely.
The significantly narrower construction of § 553(b)(A) formulated by the
Air Transport majority, focusing on whether the rules "substantially affect
civil penalty defendants' 'right to avail [themselves] of an administrative ad-
judication,' ,116 rests on an early articulation of the D.C. Circuit in National
Motor Freight. In National Motor Freight, the decision by the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) to resolve the claims of reparations for past
illegal rates by means of informal settlement had "palpable effects" upon
other industry members and embodied precisely the type of action that
would benefit from the information gathered in a notice-and-comment type
rulemaking.2 17 Yet, the agency action in National Motor Freight differed
210. In American Hospital, the "incidental inconveniences" imposed by the first PRO
Manual constituted minor burdens that do not justify the imposition of notice-and-comment
procedures. American Hosp., 834 F.2d at 1051. Similarly, the PRO Manual IM85-3 and the
Program Directive No. 2 "neither change[ ] the standard of PRO review, nor impose[ ] any-
thing greater than incidental mechanical burdens on regulated hospitals." Id.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 197-99.
212. Judicial review of final decisions and orders of penalty assessment issued by the FAA
is contemplated in the Demonstration Program itself. See 14 C.F.R. § 13.235 (1992).
213. As stated by the Batterton court in its comparison of legislative rules with their coun-
terpart, "non-binding agency statements carry no more weight on judicial review than their
inherent persuasiveness commands." Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 702 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (citing General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976)).
214. See supra text accompanying note 130.
215. See Hauser, supra note 175, at 550.
216. Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Department of Transp., 900 F.2d 369, 372 (D.C. Cir.
1990), vacated, I ll S. Ct. 944 (1991) (citing National Motor Freight Ass'n v. United States,
268 F. Supp. 90 (D.D.C. 1967) (three-judge court), aff'd, 393 U.S. 18 (1968)); see supra notes
146-51 and accompanying text.
217. National Motor Freight, 268 F. Supp. at 96.
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significantly from the action in Air Transport, and one must carefully con-
sider Judge Edward's complete reliance on that decision.2"'
While both decisions concern the adjudicatory rights of regulated parties,
the court in National Motor Freight justified its decision to invalidate the
rulemaking largely on the absence of any Congressional direction to estab-
lish the challenged informal settlement procedures.2 ' 9 The legislative act
that prompted the ICC rulemaking specified the need for a judicial remedy
for aggrieved parties and expressly restricted the agency from initiating
prosecutorial action. 220 By contrast, the FAA was "under ... injunction
from Congress" to promulgate the Rules of Practice. 22' The Civil Penalty
Assessment Demonstration Program explicitly required the FAA to render
all penalty assessments "only after notice and opportunity for a hearing on
the record in accordance with [§ ] 554" of the APA.2 22 Courts have gener-
ally distinguished between rules whereby "an agency is merely explicating
Congress' desires from those ... in which [an] agency is adding substantive
content of its own., 22 3  The established authority by which the FAA
promulgated the Rules of Practice and the specifically prescribed objective
218. Judge Silberman in his dissent questioned the majority's reliance on the "old and now
discredited district court case." Air Transport, 900 F.2d at 383 (Silberman, J., dissenting).
Furthermore, National Motor Freight received only a summary affirmation by the Supreme
Court, rendering its reasoning suspect. Id. In general, courts are less inclined to overrule a
decision that has been affirmed by an opinion that discusses the merits. Under Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), "[a] summary disposition affirms only the judgment of the
court below, and no more may be read into our action than was essential to sustain that judg-
ment." Id. at 785 n.5, quoted in Air Transport, 900 F.2d at 383 (Silberman, J., dissenting); see
also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670-71 (1974) (limiting the precedential value of sum-
mary affirmances). The dissent in Air Transport therefore dismissed the majority's faithful
alignment with the reasoning advanced in National Motor Freight. Air Transport, 900 F.2d at
383 (Silberman, J., dissenting).
219. National Motor Freight, 268 F. Supp. at 96 (stating that "[t]he Commission was...
under no injunction from Congress" to establish informal settlement procedures).
220. Id. at 92-93.
221. Id. at 96. The dissent emphasized this factual distinction in discrediting the major-
ity's reliance on National Motor Freight. Air Transport, 900 F.2d at 384 n.3. Judge Silberman
noted this disparity between the administrative scheme of informal settlements established in
National Motor Freight and the Rules of Practice developed by the FAA in Air Transport, but
placed primary emphasis in his decision on the dubious precedential value of the National
Motor Freight decision. Id.
222. 49 U.S.C. § 1475(d)(1) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990). Other limitations established by Con-
gress in the Demonstration Program allowed the FAA to assess civil penalties only on actions
initiated after December 30, 1987, not in excess of $50,000, and only for a one-and-a-half year
period. Id. at § 1475(d)(2)-(4); see also supra note 133.
223. Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 726, 728 (E.D. Va. 1988) (quoting
American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1987), aff'd, 885 F.2d 866
(4th Cir. 1989)).
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that these were designed to meet, only detract from the significance accorded
National Motor Freight by the majority opinion.224
Perhaps more troubling is the effort of the majority in Air Transport to
establish different levels of scrutiny for determining the applicability of the
exemption based on the type of procedural rule that is being questioned.
Recognizing the continued validity of the American Hospital decision, the
court in Air Transport commented that "the public has no legitimate interest
in influencing an agency's 'discretionary deployment of enforcement re-
sources,'.., a classic 'internal' matter essential to how an agency constitutes
itself."' 225 The court stated that, similar to the enforcement directives in
American Hospital, agency rules that somehow particularize the manner in
which private parties apply for benefits also qualify as internal agency opera-
tions exempt from notice and comment.2 26 Thus, the Air Transport court
reasoned that the decision by the D.C. Circuit to sustain the abbreviated
rulemaking procedures contested in Neighborhood TV Co. v. FCC 227 was
not inconsistent with its decision.228 In Neighborhood TV, the rules con-
cerned interim measures governing the processing of license applications
while the agency, the Federal Communications Commission, contemplated a
change in policy concerning low power television stations.229 Although the
interim procedures mandated a processing freeze for certain applications, 23 °
they "did not affect any component of a party's statutory or constitutional
right to avail himself of an administrative adjudication. ,231 However, the
Air Transport court was unable to demonstrate adequately its proposed dis-
tinction between a rulemaking that implicates enforcement strategies or ben-
efit application procedures and a rulemaking that alters a party's
adjudicatory rights. As Batterton revealed, the Department of Labor's
adoption of a new methodology for calculating unemployment rates can
have impermissible consequences on the benefits received.232 Air Transport's
"bright line test" focusing on rules that encumber adjudicatory rights is in-
224. See Association of Nat'l Advertisers v. FTC, 617 F.2d 611, 629 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(Skelly, C.J., concurring in result only) (distinguishing National Motor Freight because that
procedural challenge did not involve a rule which sought "to follow congressionally prescribed
procedures" and judicial review was "limited or non-existent").
225. Air Transport Ass'n of Am. v. Department of Transp., 900 F.2d 369, 377 (D.C. Cir.
1990), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 944 (1991) (quoting American Hosp., 834 F.2d at 1057 (citation
omitted)).
226. Id.
227. 742 F.2d 629, 637 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
228. Air Transport, 900 F.2d at 377.
229. Neighborhood TV, 742 F.2d at 631-34.
230. Id. at 632.
231. Air Transport, 900 F.2d at 377.
232. Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see supra text accompany-
ing notes 91-94.
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consistent with the language of the exemption provision of § 553, which al-
ludes to no such interpretation.233 Whereas the Rules of Practice in Air
Transport represent such rules, affecting the manner in which administrative
civil penalty trials themselves are brought, they no more than other enforce-
ment practices or disbursement schemes suggest the importance of notice-
and-comment procedures, no matter how appealing the assurance of funda-
mental fairness and thoughtful deliberation derived from public participa-
tion may be.234  Neither the language of the APA nor the judicial
interpretations that have followed support this ambitious effort to separate
rules that detail procedures for an administrative adjudication from agency
action that governs enforcement schemes, license applications, or rate
calculations.
The dissenting opinion in Air Transport revealed an approach that is far
more consistent with the judicial trend of retreating from the substantial
impact test and moving in the direction of furthering congressional intent
concerning the promulgation of procedural rules. 235 The "substantial im-
pact" that Judge Silberman proposed as appropriate for notice-and-comment
rulemaking is the impact perceived from any rule that affects the conduct of
private parties as contemplated by the authorizing statute and its regula-
tions.2 36 The standard recommended by Judge Silberman does not validate
the Association's argument that the rules infringe on basic notions of fair-
ness and due process rights. This issue is appropriately addressed as "an
entirely separate matter which can be raised in a concrete setting., 237  Im-
posing one's views on whether procedural rulemaking would be more satis-
233. See supra note 13.
234. Elsewhere in the law, courts have had to attend to the substantive-procedural distinc-
tion in determining the validity of rules that govern adjudicatory matters. In re Gailey, Inc.
contemplated the definition of "procedural" to ascertain the validity of a retroactivity provi-
sion. In re Gailey, Inc., 119 B.R. 504, 510 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990). The court concluded that
"if it... merely prescribes a method for enforcing [substantive rights] or for obtaining redress
for a grievance," the provision will be upheld as procedural. Id.; see also Masino v. Outboard
Marine Corp., 88 F.R.D. 251, 255 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (holding "majority verdict rule" to be
procedural in determining the appropriate law to be applied in diversity suit because it "pre-
scribe[s] the manner in which.., rights and responsibilities may be exercised and enforced in a
court"), aff'd, 652 F.2d 330 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 655 (1981).
235. See discussion supra part I.B-C.
236. See Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Department of Transp., 900 F.2d 369, 382 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (Silberman, J., dissenting), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 944 (1991) (articulating that rules with a
substantial impact "purport to direct, control, or condition the behavior" of private parties);
see also supra text accompanying note 172.
237. Air Transport, 900 F.2d at 382. Judge Silberman believes that where aggrieved parties
have an opportunity to contest the procedural validity of an agency's action in a related adjudi-
cation initiated by the agency at a later time, congressional intent to promote agency activity
by exempting informal rulemaking procedures must prevail over the benefits obtained from
public participation. See also supra text accompanying notes 196-99.
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factory if accompanied by notice and comment is entirely inappropriate
where Congress has addressed the matter.2 38
Judge Silberman's dissent demonstrates an attempt to formulate the
American Hospital inquiry in different terms. The objective of this formula-
tion is to articulate more clearly what is at the core of the substantive-proce-
dural distinction: exposing regulation that affects primary conduct to the
procedural safeguards of notice and comment. The dissent underscores the
deficiencies of the majority opinion and remains faithful to congressional in-
tent by allowing the exemption to accommodate more than simply the most
"insignificant rules." 23
9
III. COMMENT: To WHAT EXTENT SHOULD THE COURTS PERMIT
AGENCIES TO PROMULGATE PROCEDURAL RULES WITHOUT
NOTICE AND COMMENT AS CONTEMPLATED IN
§ 553(b)(A) OF THE APA?
The reasons that prompted the D.C. Circuit in Cabais to abandon the
longstanding substantial impact test for interpretative rules suggest that
rules of procedure might also benefit from a similar upheaval. 2 1 Citing Ver-
mont Yankee, the Cabais court concluded that the substantial impact test
was insufficiently accurate to distinguish properly between interpretative and
legislative rulemaking for purposes of determining the applicability of the
exemption under § 553(b)(A). 24 ' As in Batterton, the court recognized the
test as "one of several criteria" which comprise the exemption inquiry, but
explicitly rejected its validity as the primary means for settling the issue of
that exemption's scope because of its tendency towards overinclusiveness.2 42
Interpretative rules will invariably render explanations that private parties
will find undesirable and intolerable for the burdens that they impose.24 3
Curiously enough, the court in Cabais noted that the substantial impact test
may still be applicable to statements of general policy under § 553(b)(A) and
agency action governed by "good cause" under § 553(b)(B), but refrained
from making any comment concerning the procedural rule exemption.2"
Ultimately, what guided the Cabais court in its decision was "strict adher-
ence to the letter of the APA," the availability of alternative judicial reme-
238. Air Transport, 900 F.2d at 383.
239. Id.
240. See Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1982); supra text accompanying
notes 69-74 and 191-99.
241. Cabais, 690 F.2d at 237 (citing Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 709 n.83 (D.C.
Cir. 1980)); see also supra note 35.
242. Cabais, 690 F.2d at 237.
243. See id.; see also supra note 195 and accompanying text.
244. Cabais, 690 F.2d at 237.
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dies for aggrieved parties, and .the judicial weight that courts will assign to
abbreviated administrative rulemaking.245
These considerations have led courts to question previous adherence to
the substantial impact test for the purpose of evaluating the substantive-pro-
cedural distinction. As illustrated by the American Hospital decision, courts
successfully contend with the broad reach of the substantial impact test by
inquiring further whether the agency action affects interests beyond the
scope of the enabling act and its regulations. 246 The Batterton court noted
the inadequacies of the substantial impact test and instead relied on the judi-
cial deference that notice-and-comment rulemaking invokes in contrast to
abbreviated procedures.2 47 Finally, the Air Transport dissent recognized the
failing of the courts in imposing the significant burdens of notice and com-
ment where alternative avenues for redress provide adequate relief.248
The role of the challenged agency regulation to the enabling statute is also
significant in the determination of the exemption's applicability. Disre-
garded by the Air Transport court, this criterion seeks to establish whether
the authorizing congressional act suggested a need for the agency action. As
the dissent in Air Transport recognized, Congress specifically called for ad-
ministrative adjudications in accordance with § 554 of the APA, thereby re-
quiring the FAA to implement rules in order to comply with that
standard.249 Unlike the factual circumstances in National Motor Freight,
which provided no such congressional backing,250 the Demonstration Pro-
gram in Air Transport gave the court no reason to doubt the authority sup-
porting the Rules of Practice.251  Additionally, the Air Transport rules did
not constitute gap-filling measures, rising to the level of substantive rulemak-
ing, for Congress nowhere, either explicitly or implicitly, mandated that the
agency employ its expertise in detailing specific statutory provisions.
252
The considerations that guided the Cabais court in its decision for inter-
pretative rules are equally relevant and insightful when considering proce-
dural rules. Congress, in creating the exemption, established that the
promulgation of procedural rules should be governed by different concerns
which supersede the benefits of public participation.253 Encouraging agency
245. Id. at 237 n.6.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 112-13.
247. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
248. See Air Transport Ass'n of Am. v. Department of Transp., 900 F.2d 369, 382 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (Silberman, J., dissenting), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 944 (199 1); see also supra text accom-
panying note 237.
249. Air Transport, 900 F.2d at 384 n.3.
250. See supra notes 218-20 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 132-35, 221-22 and accompanying text.
252. See supra text accompanying note 223; see also supra text accompanying note 194.
253. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
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action and thereby promoting efficiency and effectiveness were the objectives
that Congress sought to achieve.25 4 Courts should be less reluctant to recog-
nize the validity of procedural rules and should permit the corresponding
exemption to coexist with notice-and-comment rulemaking where alterna-
tive safeguards exist and the agency is acting pursuant to congressional
mandate.
IV. CONCLUSION
Past decisions addressing the exemption for rules of agency organization,
procedure, or practice demonstrate the elusiveness of a bright line test that
allows for easy characterization of rulemaking activity and defines in clear
terms the scope of the exemption under § 553(b)(A) of the APA. Because of
the explicit congressional mandate to exempt such rules, courts must address
the ambiguity of the exemption rather than simply adopt the position that
rules of procedure, because of the inherent impact on members of the general
public, be accompanied by notice and opportunity for comment. 255 Air
Transport portrays the "idiosyncratic" nature of past court decisions that
confront the substantive-procedural distinction for rules of procedure under
§ 553.256 The Air Transport court's efforts to arrive at a "facile semantic
distinction,, 2 7 however, stand on shaky ground. Largely ignoring the sig-
nificant observations made over the past decade in decisions interpreting the
exemption provision, the court in Air Transport imposed strict notice-and-
comment compliance for procedural rules such as the FAA Rules of
Practice.
Agencies presently embarking on rulemaking under the exemption of
§ 553(b)(A) must anticipate the likelihood of increased scrutiny where adju-
dicatory procedures are involved and a party's right to an administrative
hearing is implicated. While the imposition of notice-and-comment proce-
dures in such instances arguably represents the judicially engrafted proce-
dures that Vermont Yankee so firmly criticized, it will ultimately only serve
254. See supra text accompanying note 174.
255. The Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) has in the past recom-
mended the elimination of the exemptions under § 553 in favor of public participation, thereby
allowing some procedural rules to remain exempt under § 553(a)(2) as "matters of agency
management and personnel." Recommendation 69-8, "Elimination of Certain Exemptions
from the APA Rulemaking Requirements," I C.F.R. § 305.69-8 (1992); Recommendation
76-5, "Interpretative Rules of General Applicability and Statements of General Policy," I
C.F.R. § 305.76-5 (1992); Recommendation 83-2, "The 'Good Cause' Exemption from APA
Rulemaking Requirements," I C.F.R. § 305.83-2 (1992). Similarly, the states have generally
restricted exempting procedural rulemaking from statutory purposes except for matters of in-
ternal management, an equivalent to the § 533(a)(2) provision.
256. American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F. 2d 1037, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
257. Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Finch, 307 F. Supp. 858, 863 (D. Del. 1970).
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to impede the efficient and effective operation of administrative agencies.
Agencies wishing to avoid preliminary procedural challenges have no choice
but to engage in notice-and-comment procedures-and the accompanying
expense and inconvenience-in order to secure the judicial deference that
such legislative rules command. There are many reasons why an agency
may choose to adopt procedures for public participation,258 but the explicit
exemption in § 553(b)(A) should prevent courts from making that judgment
on behalf of agencies and narrowing the scope of the exemption's intended
application.
When an agency promulgates procedural rules in direct response to Con-
gressional legislation, the presence of alternative safeguards should caution
against imposing notice-and-comment procedures. The Rules of Practice in
Air Transport present no exigent circumstances that might warrant the more
stringent approach taken by that court. As revealed in the Air Transport
dissent, the tenuous reasoning on which the majority decision rests provides
little basis for abandoning the approach articulated in American Hospital.
Both practical in its application and faithful to Congressional intent, the
American Hospital inquiry and its focus on the impact of procedural rules on
the ultimate rights and obligations as established by Congress poses the more
appealing solution to the elusive substantive-procedural distinction.
Jessica S. Schaffer
258. The Batterton court in its discussion of legislative and non-legislative rules noted the
incidental benefit of "giv[ing] the public a sense of fair consideration" in addition to that of
avoiding litigation. Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 701 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citing
Guardian Fed. Say. Ass'n & Loan v. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 589 F.2d 658, 669 (D.C.
Cir. 1978)).
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